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Commercial Speech, “Irrational” Clients, and the 
Persistence of Bans on Subjective Lawyer Advertising 
Nat Stern 
Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading 
commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either 
deception or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive 
assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the 
truth.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding a string of defeats in the United States Supreme 
Court,2 the organized legal profession has hardly relented in its 
efforts to limit lawyer advertising.3 Among the most dubious 
restrictions to which many states have clung is the prohibition on 
“self-laudatory” claims or other subjective representations by 
attorneys.4 This Article argues that a categorical ban on such claims 
rests on premises at odds with the Court’s commercial speech 
jurisprudence. In particular, the prohibition clashes with the Court’s 
disapproval of sweeping restrictions rooted in paternalistic 
assumptions about the public’s capacity to assess commercial 
advertising. Admittedly, the Court has indicated some latitude for 
states to curb representations about legal services that are not 
susceptible to objective verification. Given the broader foundations 
of commercial speech doctrine, however, these pronouncements 
 
  John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University College of 
Law. Gennifer Powell and Megan Warren provided valuable research support. 
 1. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
plurality). 
 2. See infra Part II.C. 
 3. See generally Ron Edelman, Effective, Ethical Advertising, 2 ANN. 2006 ATLA-CLE 
2617 (2006); Differences Between State Advertising and Solicitation Rules and the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (article on file with author); Michael D. Johnston, The Litigation 
Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and Their Consequences, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 179, 198–99 (2007); 
Jay D. Kreisman & Menachem Lanner, Comment, The Cahill Decision: Evolution or 
Revolution? An Analysis of Alexander v. Cahill and Its Effect on Attorney Advertising, 21 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 841, 841–42,  854–55 (2008). 
 4. See, e.g., IND. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2(b) (2007); S.C. APP. CT. R. 7.2(f) 
(2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-18-appx-7.1(c)(3) (2009). 
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cannot be taken to support wholesale suppression of attorney 
advertising that exceeds the narrow presentation of data. On the 
contrary, ambiguities in the application of commercial speech 
principles to such provisions should be resolved in favor of the 
doctrine’s fundamental impulse in favor of expression. Part II 
provides an overview of the Court’s commercial speech doctrine, 
including discrete treatment of cases involving lawyer advertising and 
solicitation.5 Part III sets forth central tenets underpinning the 
Court’s approach to commercial speech. Part IV examines the 
tension between these principles and categorically forbidding self-
laudatory and other subjective attorney advertising. 
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE SUPREME COURT: AN OVERVIEW6 
Qualified enthusiasm for First Amendment protection has 
marked the Court’s modern approach to commercial speech. Indeed, 
the Court has emphasized that larger principles protecting freedom 
of expression substantially govern commercial speech. At the same 
time, a subsidiary strain has ceded to government-enhanced 
regulatory authority said to arise from the distinctive features of this 
category of expression.7 These dual impulses are displayed by the 
 
 5. For purposes of the analysis offered here, the formal distinction that can be drawn 
between advertising and solicitation is not significant. See Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass’n, 412 
N.E.2d 927, 931 (N.Y. 1980); Rex R. Preschbacher & Debra Bassett Hamilton, Reading 
Beyond the Labels: Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Targeted Direct Mail Advertising, 58 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 255, 256 (1987); see also Robert Battey, Note, Loosening the Glue: Lawyer 
Advertising, Solicitation, and Commercialism in 1995, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 287, 287 n.7 
(1995) (asserting that the distinction between advertising and solicitation “is becoming 
blurred” with respect to mailed material). 
 6. For a more detailed account, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1227–62 (7th ed. 2004). 
 7. This mixed treatment of commercial speech falls roughly in the philosophical middle 
of the range of commentary inspired by the Court’s decisions. At one end, many observers 
have criticized the Court’s substantial constitutional recognition of a category of expression 
that they believe to be far removed from the core purposes of the First Amendment. See, e.g., 
C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 
(1976) (“[A] complete denial of first amendment protection for commercial speech is not only 
consistent with, but is required by, first amendment theory.”); Lillian R. BeVier, The First 
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 
STAN. L. REV 299, 352–55 (1978) (asserting commercial advertising’s irrelevance to political 
speech); Reza R. Dibadj, The Political Economy of Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV 913, 
916–19 (2007) (arguing that protection of commercial speech, unlike political speech, is not 
securely grounded in the Constitution’s establishment of representative democracy); Thomas 
H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First 
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 38 (1979) (concluding that regulation of ordinary business 
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ambivalent character of the Court’s two seminal decisions in the 
area, the larger trajectory of the Court’s jurisprudence, and the 
specific treatment of restrictions on lawyer advertising. 
A. Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson: Foundations of 
a Two-Track Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Two decisions, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,8 and Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,9 supply the origin and 
framework of the Court’s commercial speech doctrine. While 
arguably not entirely compatible,10 the Court’s reasoning in both 
cases continues to inform its disposition of commercial speech issues. 
Depending on their construction in a given instance, both holdings 
 
advertising has “nothing to do” with freedom of expression); Tamara R. Piety, Against 
Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV 2583, 2645–49 (2008). By contrast, 
others have challenged commercial speech’s status as a mode of expression warranting 
diminished First Amendment protection. A prominent exponent of this view has been Martin 
Redish, see, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 630–35 
(1982) (arguing that similar constitutional protection of commercial and noncommercial 
speech would serve the First Amendment’s value of self-realization), whose calls for placing 
commercial speech on a plane comparable to other expression have been echoed by numerous 
commentators. See, e.g., William W. Eldridge, Just Do It: Kasky v. Nike, Inc. Illustrates That It 
Is Time to Abandon the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 179, 208 
(2003); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 
627, 627–53 (1990); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 
78 NW. U. L. REV. 1137, 1172–75 (1983) (arguing difficulty of determining contours of 
commercial speech category militates against lesser protection); Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 135, 216 (1996). Between these two perspectives lies commentary expressing basic 
sympathy with the Court’s approach. See, e.g., James J. Barney, The Mixed Message: The 
Supreme Court’s Missed Opportunity to Address the Confused State of Commercial Speech in 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky?, 37 UWLA L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2004); Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, 
Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317, 1382 (1988) (favorably 
comparing Court’s approach to commercial speech with proposed alternatives); Patrick D. 
Curran, Diluting the Commercial Speech Doctrine: “Noncommercial Use” and the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1077, 1095–96, 1098 (2004); Frederick 
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 
290 (1981) (endorsing limited protection of commercial speech). 
 8. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 9. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 10. See id. at 576 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that Virginia Board of Pharmacy 
provided more stringent protection); see also Jeffrey Lefstin, Does the First Amendment Bar 
Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665, 672 (2000); Todd J. Locher, Comment, 
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox: Cutting Back on Commercial 
Speech Standards, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1335, 1338 (1990). 
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contain the seeds of both robust protection and diminished status for 
commercial speech. 
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court explicitly embraced 
the proposition that First Amendment principles govern the 
regulation of commercial speech.11 Rather than treat Virginia’s ban 
on advertising prescription drug prices as ordinary commercial 
regulation,12 the Court invoked a number of First Amendment 
values to strike down the prohibition. Prominent among these was 
self-realization.13 With access to relative prices, reasoned the Court, 
consumers least able to bear the costs of prescription drugs could 
gain “the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic 
necessities.”14 The Court also linked the free flow of commercial 
information to the First Amendment’s fundamental concern with 
democratic decision-making. In the Court’s estimate, the availability 
of commercial information is essential to informed public decisions 
about the manner in which America’s economy should be regulated 
or altered.15 Perhaps most importantly, the Court regarded Virginia’s 
 
 11. Several decades earlier, the Court had apparently deemed commercial speech 
unworthy of consideration under the First Amendment. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 
U.S. 52, 54 (1942), overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748 (declaring “purely 
commercial advertising” as outside the ambit of free speech guarantee). Even prior to Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy, however, the Court had effectively retreated from this position. See, e.g., 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826, 829 (1975) (invalidating enforcement of statute 
forbidding encouragement of abortions against advertisement of out-of-state abortion 
services); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (holding that allegedly 
defamatory statements otherwise eligible for constitutional protection “do not forfeit that 
protection because they were published in the form of a paid advertisement”); Breard v. 
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (reasoning that “the fact that periodicals are sold does 
not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment,” but upholding door-to-door 
solicitations of magazine subscriptions), overruled by Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 & n.7 (1980); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Commercial 
Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L. REV. 1080, 1084–1101 (reviewing 
development of commercial speech doctrine from Chrestensen to Virginia Board of Pharmacy). 
 12. See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing for 
traditional deferential review of “a seller hawking his wares”). 
 13. See C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and 
Redish’s The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652 (1982) (referring to “self-
realization” and “individual liberty” as values embodied in the First Amendment); see also 
Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of 
Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 810 (1999); Martin H. Redish & Howard M. 
Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 244–45 (1998). 
 14. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–64. 
 15. Id. at 765 (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)). The Court has frequently endorsed Meiklejohn’s thesis, see 
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justifications for suppressing drug price advertising as incompatible 
with the First Amendment’s basic assumption that government may 
not stifle expression for fear of its communicative impact.16 The state 
had cited several potential adverse consequences from unrestrained 
advertising: consumers flocking to cheaper but less professional 
pharmacists, the undermining of stable pharmacist-customer 
relationships as consumers pursued momentarily lowest prices, and 
erosion of the profession itself because the pharmacist’s image as a 
“mere retailer” would discourage entry of talented individuals.17 
Without entirely discounting these concerns, the Court found them 
insufficient in that they largely derived from the “advantages of 
[citizens] being kept in ignorance.”18 This “highly paternalistic 
approach,” the Court determined, clashed with the First 
Amendment’s decree that “the dangers of suppressing information” 
exceed “the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available.”19 
Accordingly, the Court ruled that a state may not “completely 
suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about 
entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s effect upon its 
disseminators and its recipients.”20 
 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra at 22–27, that protection of discussion of public issues lies at the heart of 
the First Amendment’s protection of free speech. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (“The First Amendment affords the broadest protection 
to . . . political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’” (citation omitted)); 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) 
(“The First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in 
and contribute to our republican system of self-government.” (citation omitted)); Mills v. 
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major 
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.”). 
 16. This understanding of the First Amendment’s powerful presumption in favor of 
unfettered speech was famously voiced by Justice Holmes, see Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Only the emergency that makes it 
immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any 
exception to the sweeping command, ‘Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of 
speech.’”), and Justice Brandeis, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and 
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before 
there is opportunity for full discussion.”) overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969). 
 17. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 768. 
 18. Id. at 769. 
 19. Id. at 770. 
 20. Id. at 773. 
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At the same time, the Court refused to equate commercial 
speech with fully protected forms of expression, suggesting that the 
nature of the state’s regulatory interest and of commercial speech 
itself warrant a greater degree of restriction than would be tolerated 
elsewhere. The Court acknowledged that the state is entitled to curb 
impediments to the dissemination of “truthful and legitimate 
commercial information . . . .”21 In assessing the validity of such 
measures, the Court would take into account two distinctive features 
of commercial speech. First, advertisers’ familiarity with their product 
or service typically places them in position to evaluate the accuracy of 
their representations.22 Second, the economic incentive to advertise 
reduces the possibility that appropriate regulation would severely 
deter commercial speech.23 These attributes of comparative 
“objectivity” and “hardiness,” reasoned the Court, might justify 
greater governmental authority in this realm to insist on truthful 
speech, to require forms of presentation and inclusion of information 
designed to prevent deception, and to impose prior restraints.24 
Four years later in Central Hudson, the Court again coupled 
invalidation of a ban on advertising with a concession to state power 
to regulate commercial speech.25 There, the Court struck down New 
York’s prohibition of all advertising by electric utilities to promote 
the use of electricity. According to the Court, the state’s blanket ban 
barred more speech than was necessary to further the State’s interest 
in energy conservation.26 This conclusion resulted from application 
of the final prong of a four-part standard for commercial speech 
regulation that the Court had promulgated earlier in the opinion. To 
qualify for protection, commercial speech must first concern lawful 
activity and must not be misleading.27 Once past this threshold, the 
analysis shifts to the state’s justification for the restriction at issue. In 
the second step, a court inquires “whether the asserted government 
interest is substantial.”28 If it is, the court then determines whether 
 
 21. Id. at 772 n.24. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 26. Id. at 569–72. The Court noted both proscribed advertising that would not detract 
from the state’s goal and less restrictive alternatives that might foster the state’s interest just as 
effectively.  Id. at 570–71. 
 27. Id. at 566. 
 28. Id. 
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the regulation directly advances the interest asserted, and—assuming 
the first three conditions are met—whether the regulation is “more 
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”29 
While the final requirement is the most stringent part of the test, 
and produced a speech-protective outcome in Central Hudson, even 
this criterion could be construed to afford the state significant power 
to limit commercial speech. In faulting the state’s failure to 
demonstrate that “a more limited restriction on the content of 
promotional advertising” would not achieve the state’s purpose,30 
the Court implied its potential approval of certain narrowly tailored 
restrictions. Central Hudson can thus be read to suggest that in some 
instances, accurate information about a legal product can be 
suppressed to dampen demand for that product.31 
B. The Prevalence of Protection 
In confronting commercial speech issues, the Court has 
predominantly, though not invariably, been guided by the protective 
aspects of its two leading decisions. Even those decisions upholding 
restrictions can generally be explained by reference to their particular 
contexts rather than as signaling a wider regime of relaxed scrutiny. 
Both the tenor and results of more recent decisions underscore the 
Court’s commitment to searching review of commercial speech 
regulation. 
Only one term after Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court 
affirmed that suppression of commercial expression, even in service 
of a worthy aim, would not be justified by fear of harmful reaction to 
truthful information. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of 
Willingboro,32 the Court overturned an ordinance forbidding display 
of “For Sale” or “Sold” signs. The town had sought to “stem . . . 
the flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 570. 
 31. See id. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (disagreeing with Court “when it says that 
suppression of speech may be a permissible means” to achieve energy conservation); Lefstin, 
supra note 10, at 672 (describing Court in Central Hudson as having “largely rejected” the 
suggestion in Virginia Pharmacy that commercial speech could not be singled out by its 
content); Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 720, 728 (1982) (referring to Court’s “explicit statement” in Central 
Hudson that “the state may indeed, using narrowly drawn restrictions, suppress commercial 
speech solely to dampen demand for a legitimate product”). 
 32. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
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community.”33 Though acknowledging that the pursuit of stable, 
integrated housing constituted “an important governmental 
objective,”34 the Court would not condone a ban on signs 
containing certain content based on fear that their message would 
“cause those receiving the information to act upon it.”35 
In two other decisions, Carey v. Population Services 
International36 and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,37 the 
Court rejected rationales for barring commercial speech that would 
be insufficient in other settings. Carey involved a state’s prohibition 
of any advertisement or display of contraceptives. The Court 
dismissed out of hand the state’s justification that advertisements of 
contraceptive products would prove “offensive and embarrassing” to 
those exposed to them, noting its established principle that “the fact 
that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its 
suppression.”38 Similarly, in Bolger, the Court struck down a ban on 
mailing unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. In arguing that 
the statute shielded recipients from materials that they would 
probably find offensive, the government had sought to distinguish 
Carey by invoking the protection of seclusion in the home.39 Even in 
the case of unsolicited commercial speech, however, the Court found 
that the “‘short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash 
can . . . is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is 
concerned.’”40 
The tacit premise of Carey and Bolger—that commercial speech 
does not inherently receive lesser protection without consideration of 
its distinctly commercial aspects—received emphatic expression in 
 
 33. Id. at 86. 
 34. Id. at 95. 
 35. Id. at 94. 
 36. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 37. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
 38. 431 U.S. at 701 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)); see also Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (describing as “a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment that government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46, 55–56 (1988). 
 39. 463 U.S. at 71–72. 
 40. Id. at 72 (alteration in original); cf. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 
737 (1970) (upholding law authorizing householders to instruct mailer to stop all future 
mailings to householders where mailer has sent material that, in householders’ sole discretion, 
they believe to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative). 
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City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.41 The city of Cincinnati 
wanted to increase its overall attractiveness and safety, and thus 
passed an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of “commercial 
handbills,” including from freestanding news racks, in public areas. 
Without questioning the substantiality of these interests, the Court 
struck down the ordinance for lacking a demonstrated “‘reasonable 
fit’” between the scope of the ban and the city’s safety and aesthetic 
goals.42 Given the larger number of news racks containing 
noncommercial publications, which were presumably creating similar 
harms to public safety and aesthetics, the Court would not approve 
the city’s singling out for prohibition news racks dispensing 
“commercial handbills.”43 In particular, the Court pointedly rejected 
Cincinnati’s assertion that the “‘low value’” of commercial speech 
could justify its “selective and categorical ban” on commercially-
oriented news racks.44 On the contrary, the Court chastised the city 
for “seriously underestimat[ing] the value of commercial speech.”45 
Accordingly, the ordinance foundered on the city’s failure to assert 
any commercial harms that would be redressed by regulating the 
information distributed by the proscribed news racks.46 
By contrast, the Court in Friedman v. Rogers47 and San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee48 sustained 
challenged restrictions on commercial speech. Unlike the cases 
 
 41. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 42. Id. at 417–18 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 
480 (1989)). 
 43. See id. at 417–18, 425–26 (noting that dispensing devices for newspapers and 
commercial handbills shared similar appearance and that the number of devices devoted to 
newspapers was greater). 
 44. Id. at 428. The Court was careful to distinguish its decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. 
City of San Diego, upholding a ban on advertising billboards except those on the premises of 
the billboard’s sponsor (“onsite”). 453 U.S. 490 (1981). Justice Stevens characterized 
Metromedia as involving disparate treatment of two types of commercial speech rather than 
discrimination between commercial and noncommercial speech. Discovery, 507 U.S. at 425 
n.20. Stevens noted that the question of whether a city could distinguish between commercial 
and noncommercial offsite billboards that posed the same esthetic and safety concerns was not 
presented in the earlier case. Id. The impact of Metromedia is further limited by the absence of 
a majority opinion. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing 
the Court’s disposition of ordinance as “a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive 
principles can be clearly drawn”). 
 45. Discovery, 507 U.S. at 419. 
 46. Id. at 426. 
 47. 440 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 48. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
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discussed above, however, this pair did not involve state attempts to 
deprive consumers of accurate information, protect the sensibilities 
of mature individuals, or automatically relegate commercial speech to 
inferior First Amendment status. Rather, the impetus for the 
restrictions appears to originate from the State’s traditional 
regulatory role of promoting fair and efficient markets. For example, 
as the Virginia Board Court recognized, one of the State’s major 
functions as market regulator is to prevent the dissemination of 
information in a way that conveys a false impression of the product 
or service offered.49 In Friedman, the Court invoked this principle50 
to uphold a Texas law barring the practice of optometry under a 
trade name, which could distort the actual nature of the practice.51 
This ban only thwarted one means of presenting information that 
could be effectively communicated through other channels.52 
 Similarly, the Court’s approval of the challenged restriction in 
San Francisco Arts rested on governmental power to enforce 
property rights rather than to impede expression.53 The Court 
upheld the operation of a statute granting the United States Olympic 
Committee exclusive use of the word “Olympic” to preclude 
promotion of an athletic competition called the “Gay Olympic 
Games.”54 While the facial breadth of the statute arguably lent itself 
to a significant number of impermissible applications,55 the Court 
found no “‘realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly 
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not 
before the Court.’”56 
 
 49. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 772 n.24 (1976) (authorizing a state to require that commercial information “appear in 
such a form . . . as [is] necessary to prevent its being deceptive”). 
 50. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 16. 
 51. Id. at 12–15. For example, a trade name could prominently include an optometrist 
whose reputation draws clients but who no longer remains with the practice. Id. at 13. 
 52. Id. at 16 (noting the right to advertise service prices and other factual information 
communicated by trade names). 
 53. San Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 532–35.  
 54. Id. at 525–27, 548. 
 55. See id. at 561 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The statute is overbroad on its face . . . and 
vests the USOC with unguided discretion to approve and disapprove others’ noncommercial 
use of ‘Olympic.’”). 
 56. Id. at 536 n.15 (quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 801 (1984)); see Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: Intellectual 
Property Rights in Native American Cultural Symbols, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355, 
398 (1998) (stating that factors set forth in San Francisco Arts “legitimize the creation of an 
exclusive property right in a name or image”); Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: 
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Three other decisions—Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. 
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,57 Board of Trustees of the State University 
of New York v. Fox,58 and United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.59—
support more expansive limitations on commercial speech. 
Developments after these holdings, however, appear to have 
undermined their precedential force. Of the trio, Posadas is at once 
the most problematic for rights of commercial speech and the least 
likely to command support today. There, the Court permitted 
Puerto Rico to forbid advertising for casino gambling aimed at 
Puerto Rican residents without outlawing the gambling itself.60 Two 
features of the logic employed in Justice Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion seemed to augur a markedly less protective regime than that 
heralded by Virginia Board of Pharmacy. First, the opinion 
condoned the paternalistic legislative theory that Puerto Rico 
residents were “already aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet 
would nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to engage 
in such potentially harmful conduct.”61 Second, and even more 
ominously, the Court declared that the government’s “greater 
power” to totally prohibit an activity such as casino gambling 
encompasses the power to take the “less intrusive step” of banning 
only advertising of that activity.62 Thus, by extension, the 
government possesses comprehensive power to restrict advertising of 
all activities and products except those that have already been 
 
The Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for 
Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 417–18 (1998) (citing San Francisco Arts 
for proposition that “the First Amendment does not protect any right to misappropriate 
valuable commercial property, even if the property can be characterized as speech”). But see 
Kozinski & Banner, supra note 7, at 649 (criticizing characterization of petitioner’s expression 
in San Francisco Arts as commercial speech as providing “a convenient avenue for denying 
protection to speakers who may have had something unpopular to say”); Robert N. Kravitz, 
Trademarks, Speech and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131, 166–67, 172 (1989) 
(arguing that the Court should have found a First Amendment violation); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Trademark Law As Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737, 746 (2007) (arguing 
that the property argument in San Francisco Arts “is entirely unimpressive with respect to 
noncommercial, expressive uses” and that “[i]t is dangerous to let legislatures or common law 
define intangibles as ‘property’ to fend off First Amendment challenges”). 
 57. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
 58. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 59. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
 60. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345–46 (“[T]he greater power to completely ban casino 
gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling . . . .”). 
 61. Id. at 344. 
 62. Id. at 345–46. 
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accorded constitutional protection.63 The drastic contraction in 
rights of commercial speech signaled by this reasoning, however, 
ultimately did not materialize. A decade later, a majority of Justices 
were either acknowledging that subsequent decisions had eroded the 
deferential doctrine of Posadas64 or repudiating the opinion 
outright.65 
On the other hand, the impact of the Court’s opinion in Fox has 
been more ambiguous. The case is notable less for the specific 
dispute that it presented66 than for the Court’s exegesis of Central 
Hudson’s requirement that a restriction on commercial speech be 
“no[] more extensive than is necessary to serve [the State’s] 
interest.”67 When applied to constraints on non-commercial speech, 
this type of standard normally conveys a stringent level of scrutiny.68 
In Fox, however, the Court disavowed any suggestion that the fourth 
part of Central Hudson amounted to a “least-restrictive-means” 
test.69 Rather, what it required was a “‘fit’ between the legislature’s 
ends and . . . means . . . that is not necessarily perfect, but 
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition 
 
 63. See id. at 345 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 700–02 (1977) 
(contraceptives); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818–29 (1975) (abortions)). 
 64. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 531–32 (1996) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 65. See id. at 509–11 (Stevens, J., plurality); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 
Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999) (“[T]he power to prohibit or to regulate 
particular conduct does not necessarily include the power to prohibit or regulate speech about 
that conduct.”); Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and the Birth of 
Change in Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483, 
485 (1997) (asserting that 44 Liquormart “sound[ed] . . . the death knell for Posadas and its 
modes of analysis”). 44 Liquormart is discussed at text accompanying infra notes 94–99. 
 66. A company seeking to conduct a “Tupperware party” in a college dormitory 
challenged a university rule prohibiting commercial enterprises from operating on any of its 
campuses. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 471–72 (1989). The 
Court ultimately remanded the case to determine, in light of the opinion’s explanation of 
Central Hudson, whether the company’s proposed activity was protected and, if not, “whether 
[the rule’s] substantial overbreadth nonetheless ma[de] it unenforceable.” Id. at 485–86. 
 67. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
 68. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) 
(requiring restrictions on sexually explicit telephone messages to “be carefully tailored to 
achieve [the government’s] ends”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 
(1978) (requiring restrictions on exposition of ideas by corporations to be “‘closely drawn to 
avoid unnecessary abridgement’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per 
curiam))). 
 69. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476–81. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:11 PM 
1221 Persistence of Bans on Subjective Lawyer Advertising 
 1233 
but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served.’”70 The 
suggestion that the call for a mere “reasonable fit” signaled a 
deferential approach provoked critical commentary,71 and appeared 
to be borne out a few years later by the Court’s invocation of this 
standard to sustain a radio broadcast restriction.72 The skeptical 
scrutiny applied in more recent cases,73 however, belies the notion 
that Fox marked a decisive shift toward leniency. Thus, while the 
Court still occasionally recites Fox’s interpretation of Central 
Hudson’s fourth prong,74 the implication that this version assures 
casual review of restrictions on commercial speech has receded in the 
wake of later invalidations.75 
Finally, though Edge’s holding could have been viewed at the 
time as portending fewer safeguards for commercial speech,76 it is 
better explained as the product of special circumstances and waning 
influences. Edge upheld a federal ban on lottery advertisements by 
broadcasters licensed in states that did not conduct lotteries.77 
Enforcement in this instance was not defeated by the presence of 
over ninety percent of Edge’s audience in a neighboring state that 
sponsored a lottery.78 Even in this situation, the Court found a 
reasonable fit between the restriction and the legislative aim of 
supporting non-lottery states’ efforts to discourage participation in 
lotteries.79 Given that rationale, it is hard to dispute that the ruling 
smacks of the paternalism condemned in Virginia Board of Pharmacy 
 
 70. Id. at 480 (quotations and citations omitted). 
 71. See, e.g., Robert C. Hunter, The Voice of the Little People—A Lost Value in 
Commercial Speech Analysis, 16 VT. L. REV. 901, 909 (1992); Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected 
Marks and Protected Speech: Establishing the First Amendment Boundaries in Trademark Parody 
Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (1991); Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment, Commercial Speech 
After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep’s Clothing, 66 TUL. L. 
REV. 1931, 1950–51 (1992). 
 72. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429 (1993). The case is 
discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 76–84.  
 73. See infra Part II.C. 
 74. E.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 
(1999). 
 75. See text accompanying infra notes 85–134. 
 76. See Tara L. Lavery, Note, Commercial Speech Suffers a First Amendment Blow in 
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 549, 582 (1994); Laura J. 
Schiller, Note, The Lottery in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.: Vice or Victim of the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine?, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 127, 158 (1995). 
 77. Edge, 509 U.S. at 418, 436. 
 78. Id. at 423. 
 79. Id. at 429–30. 
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and Linmark.80 However, the Edge Court’s reliance on the now-
discredited81 logic of Posadas82 suggests that the decision retains little 
value as precedent. Moreover, if Edge and Posadas together 
represented a particular indulgence of efforts to dampen demand for 
legal “vices” like gambling,83 the Court has since abandoned that 
philosophy by subsequently rejecting similarly motivated 
restrictions.84 
One of these decisions reflecting the Court’s more recent 
protective philosophy is Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.85 In Rubin, a 
unanimous86 Court struck down a federal ban on the disclosure of 
alcohol content of beer on labels or in advertising.87 The government 
had justified the statute as designed to deter “strength wars” in 
which brewers would seek to lure consumers through the potency of 
their beer.88 Rather than accept this explanation at face value, 
however, the Court undertook to assess whether the prohibition 
squared with other provisions of the government’s regulatory 
scheme.89 In light of the inconsistencies discovered,90 the Court 
 
 80. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 
(1976); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (citing and 
quoting Va. Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770); see Edge, 509 U.S. at 439 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he [government] has selected the most intrusive, and dangerous, form of 
regulation possible—a ban on truthful information regarding a lawful activity imposed for the 
purpose of manipulating, through ignorance, the consumer choices of some of its citizens.”). 
 81. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 82. Edge, 509 U.S. at 434. 
 83. See Jef I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1147, 
1164–67 (1996); Kathryn Murphy, Note, Can the Budweiser Frogs Be Forced to Sing a New 
Tune?: Compelled Commercial Counter-Speech and the First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 1195, 
1198–99 (1998).  
 84. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (tobacco products); 
Greater New Orleans, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (casino gambling); 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (liquor); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 
514 U.S. 476 (1995) (beer). These cases are discussed at text accompanying infra notes 94–
120. 
 85. 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
 86. Justice Stevens, however, did not join the Court’s opinion because he wished to 
register more emphatic disapproval of the challenged restriction. See id. at 491  
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he constitutional infirmity in the statute is more patent than the 
Court’s opinion indicates.”). 
 87. Id. at 478, 491. 
 88. Id. at 479. 
 89. Id. at 488–89.  
 90. For example, beer companies could still disclose alcohol content in advertisements in 
those states—a majority—that permitted it. Id. at 488. 
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expressed skepticism that the labeling ban could even survive Central 
Hudson’s third requirement that a regulation of commercial speech 
directly advance the relevant government interest.91 Even if it did so, 
however, it would still fail the fourth step of the Central Hudson 
analysis, because less restrictive alternatives existed through which 
the government could advance its interest.92 Thus, this regulation of 
speech was ruled “more extensive than necessary.”93 
A year later, another attempt to curb the dissemination of 
information about alcoholic beverages received similarly harsh 
treatment in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.94 Again with 
unanimous support, the Court invalidated a Rhode Island law 
forbidding advertisement of retail liquor prices except at the place of 
sale.95 A majority of the Court seized the occasion to mount a wider 
attack on suppression of accurate commercial speech, but even the 
remaining Justices demanded meaningful congruence between 
means and ends. Speaking for four members of the Court, Justice 
Stevens denounced the state’s “wholesale suppression of truthful, 
nonmisleading information” as a measure that had not been shown 
to “significantly advance” the state’s interest in fostering 
temperance.96 Assailing the ban even more strongly, Justice Thomas 
urged a full restoration of the Virginia Board of Pharmacy doctrine, 
which he believed categorically forbade “attempts to dissuade legal 
choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant.”97 While rejecting 
Rhode Island’s law in somewhat less emphatic terms, Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion on behalf of the four remaining Justices still 
found that the ban failed Central Hudson’s requirement that a 
restriction be no “more extensive than necessary to serve the State’s 
interest.”98 Even under these Justices’ less rigorous review, the 
evident availability of less intrusive methods by which the state might 
 
 91. See id. at 489. 
 92. One option noted by the Court, directly limiting the alcohol content of beer, id. at 
490, would presumably be more effective than the labeling ban and not restrict speech at all. 
 93. Id. at 491. 
 94. 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 95. Id. at 516. 
 96. Id. at 505 (Stevens, J., plurality). 
 97. Id. at 518, 526–28 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. at 529 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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attain its goal revealed an insufficient fit between the state’s 
restriction of speech and its stated purpose.99 
The Court’s decision in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n. 
v. United States confirmed the steady trajectory of closer scrutiny of 
commercial speech regulation.100 Given an opportunity to realize 
Edge’s more far-reaching implications of regulatory power, the Court 
instead subjected the government’s defense to highly critical 
inspection.101 In Greater New Orleans, a federal law prohibited 
broadcast of promotional advertisements for privately operated, for-
profit casinos regardless of a station’s or casino’s location.102 The 
Court’s holding barred application of the law to prevent 
advertisements by broadcasters who were located in Louisiana, which 
allowed casino gambling.103 The Court manifested its skeptical 
approach by questioning the substantiality of the government’s 
interest under the second prong of Central Hudson. While accepting 
that the government could assert a “substantial interest in alleviating 
the societal ills” associated with gambling,104 the Court took notice 
of federal and state laws permitting some forms of gambling as well 
as federal authorization of broadcast advertising for certain kinds of 
gambling.105 Accordingly, the Court pronounced the federal policy 
of discouraging gambling “decidedly equivocal.”106 In any event, the 
Court determined that the federal scheme for regulating broadcast of 
gambling advertisement was “so pierced by exemptions and 
inconsistencies” that the challenged prohibition could not satisfy the 
third and fourth parts of the Central Hudson test.107 As the Court 
pointed out, federal law permitted advertising of casino gambling 
through other media, broadcast advertising of other kinds of 
 
 99. Id. at 530. Among the “less burdensome alternatives,” id. at 529, identified by 
Justice O’Connor was increasing sales taxes on alcoholic beverages. Id. at 530. 
 100. 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
 101. Id. at 186–87. 
 102. Id. at 190. 
 103. Id. at 176. 
 104. Id. at 186. 
 105. Id. at 187. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 190. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that these imperfections would not be 
fatal if Congress were to undertake substantive regulation of the gambling industry. See id. at 
196 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice Thomas found the operation of the statute 
unconstitutional based on his previously stated position that the government’s interest in 
“keep[ing] legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in 
the marketplace” is per se illegitimate. Id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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gambling, and even broadcast advertising of casino gambling by 
owners and operators besides those covered by the challenged 
provision.108 Moreover, the Court did not hesitate to offer alternative 
regulatory tools that it believed would more effectively reduce casino 
gambling’s social costs without trenching on speech.109 
This solicitude for commercial speech and probing examination 
of restrictions continued when the Court considered restraints placed 
on advertising of tobacco products in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly.110 A series of regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts 
Attorney General was aimed at preventing the deceptive and unfair 
marketing and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars, and 
at curbing underage use of these products.111 In a lengthy opinion, 
which also voided two provisions on preemption grounds,112 the 
Court ruled that the state’s concededly strong interest in combating 
underage use of tobacco113 did not justify the extent to which the 
state had barred truthful speech about legal products.114 The state’s 
ban on outdoor advertising of smokeless tobacco or cigar advertising 
within one thousand feet of a school or playground, for example, 
would almost entirely suppress advertising of these products in some 
geographical areas.115 Without showing that the Attorney General 
had carefully weighed the anticipated benefits against the burden on 
speech imposed by the “broad sweep”116 of this restriction, the ban 
 
 108. Id. at 190–92. 
 109. Id. at 192 (suggesting, inter alia, prohibitions of gambling on credit, placing limits 
on betting, and restricting locations). 
 110. 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 111. Id. at 533–34. The regulations were issued pursuant to MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 
2 (1997). 
 112. The Court held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) 
barred Massachusetts from regulating outdoor and retail point-of-sale cigarette advertising. 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 540–53 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1333; 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). 
Four Justices disputed the majority’s determination that the FCLAA precluded states and 
localities from regulating the location of cigarette advertising. Id. at 590–98 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Though he also took issue with the Court’s First 
Amendment rulings, Justice Stevens, writing for three Justices, largely agreed with the 
majority’s reasoning. See id. at 599, 605. 
 113. See id. at 556; id. at 561 (“{T]he record reveals . . . ample documentation of the 
problem with underage use of smokeless tobacco and cigars.”). 
 114. Id. at 561. 
 115. Id. at 562. 
 116. Id. at 561. 
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failed the fourth part of the Central Hudson inquiry.117 The state also 
prohibited indoor, point-of-sale advertising of smokeless tobacco and 
cigars lower than five feet from the floor of a retail establishment 
located within one thousand feet of a school or playground.118 These 
regulations failed the third and fourth steps of the Central Hudson 
analysis.119 Both determinations were rooted in the Court’s 
commonsense observation that some children are taller than five feet, 
while those of shorter stature “certainly have the ability to look 
up.”120 
Even a powerful interest in promoting health proved insufficient 
to save the restrictions at issue in Thompson v. Western States Medical 
Center.121 The case involved drug compounding, a process by which  
pharmacists combine ingredients to create medication specifically 
tailored to a particular patient.122 Under the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), pharmacists 
could dispense compounded drugs if they did not advertise or solicit 
prescriptions for the compounding of a specific drug or type of 
drug.123 The government defended this condition as a means of 
effectuating the important distinction between small-scale 
compounding and large-scale drug manufacturing.124 To preserve 
their economic feasibility, compounded drugs were exempt from the 
safety and efficacy testing to which mass-produced drugs were 
subject under the approval process of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).125 The regulatory scheme therefore treated 
advertising as a proxy for exceeding the bounds of permissible small-
 
 117. Id. at 561–66. Justice Stevens, while largely in accord with the Court’s analysis, 
would have vacated the summary judgment and remanded for further fact finding on some 
issues. Id. at 599–603 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 118. Id. at 535–36. 
 119. Id. at 566–67. 
 120. Id. at 566. Justice Thomas, though endorsing the Court’s conclusions concerning 
the First Amendment challenges, would have employed a stricter standard than the Central 
Hudson framework to dispose of them. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 121. 535 U.S. 357 (2001). 
 122. Id. at 360–61. 
 123. 21 U.S.C. § 353a(a), (c) (2006). 
 124. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 368–70. The FDA, afraid that some pharmacists 
were using a compounding as a guise to circumvent the process for the approval of new drugs, 
implemented various restrictions on compounding, including a prohibition on advertising and 
promoting certain compounds. Id. at 362–65. 
 125. Id. at 369–70. 
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scale compounding, which would act as a “trigger” for activating the 
required FDA approval process.126 
After equivocal observations on whether the advertising ban 
directly advanced the government’s interest under the third prong of 
the Central Hudson test,127 the Court struck down the ban for failing 
the fourth requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be no 
more extensive than necessary.128 In the Court’s analysis, the 
government had not met its burden of showing why several 
alternative methods that did not affect speech129 would not 
accomplish the asserted goal.130 In addition, the majority was equally 
unimpressed with the dissenters’ argument that the restriction could 
be justified by the government’s interest in curbing the sale of 
compounded drugs to “patients who may not clearly need them.”131 
Aside from the absence of this explanation in the government’s 
briefs,132 the Court found that the government’s position suffered 
from reliance on a rationale that had been rejected in Virginia Board 
of Pharmacy. Just as Virginia could not suppress price advertising by 
pharmacists for fear of its impact on consumers’ behavior, the federal 
government could not bar advertising of compounded drugs out of 
fear that people with dubious need would be roused to obtain 
prescriptions from their doctors.133 For the Court, both prohibitions 
rested fatally on the strategy of “preventing the dissemination of 
truthful commercial information in order to prevent members of the 
public from making bad decisions with the information.”134 
C. Lawyer Advertising as Protected Speech 
The Court did not exempt broad and longstanding restrictions 
on lawyer advertising from the potent commercial speech doctrine 
 
 126. Id. at 370. 
 127. See id. at 371. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Among the measures suggested by the Court were banning the use of commercial-
scale equipment for compounding drugs, forbidding pharmacists to compound drugs beyond 
those needed to fill prescriptions already received, and limiting the amount of any particular 
compounded drug that a pharmacist could sell within a certain period. Id. at 372. 
 130. Id. at 373. 
 131. Id. (citing id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). Justice Breyer’s dissent was joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg. 
 132. Id. at 373–74 (rejecting “hypothesized justifications” under heightened review). 
 133. Id. at 374–75. 
 134. Id. at 374. 
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launched by Virginia Board of Pharmacy. Against a backdrop of 
decades of advertising prohibitions135 and judicial deference to state 
regulation of the legal profession,136 the Court brought lawyer 
advertising within its newly protective framework only a year after 
deciding Virginia Board. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,137 the 
Court held that a state could not block attorney advertising about 
the price of routine legal services.138 Bates sparked a series of rulings 
in which the Court mostly overturned state attempts to prevent 
lawyers from disseminating truthful information about their practice. 
In Bates, Arizona advanced an array of justifications for its ban.139 
Central to the state’s position was the contention that attorney 
advertising would inherently convey misleading impressions of the 
content and quality of the services promoted. In particular, the state 
argued that variations in the provision of services made meaningful 
comparisons through advertisement impossible, that clients cannot 
ascertain beforehand exactly what services they will need, and that 
attorneys’ advertising would obscure the importance of skill by 
“highlight[ing] irrelevant factors.”140 To the Court, these arguments 
essentially amounted to a reprise of the same condescending logic 
that marred Virginia’s attempt to shield consumers from advertised 
drug prices. Unlike the Arizona Supreme Court, the Court was 
willing to assume that clients could identify the general nature of the 
services that they sought,141 and that they were sufficiently 
 
 135. Lori B. Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 967, 968. In the nineteenth century, however, advertising was common 
among American lawyers. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 213 (1953). 
 136. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (“The interest of 
the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary 
governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the 
courts.’”). 
 137. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
 138. Id. at 384. The offending newspaper advertisement stated that the appellants’ “legal 
clinic” was offering “legal services at very reasonable fees” and listed their fees for services such 
as uncontested divorces and simple personal bankruptcies. Id. at 354. 
 139. The Court addressed each of these in turn: the commercialism fostered by price 
advertising would undermine professionalism, id. at 368–72; attorney advertising is inherently 
misleading, id. at 372–75; advertising would adversely affect the administration of justice by 
instigating litigation, id. at 375–77; the added costs of advertising would cause clients’ fees to 
rise, id. at 377–78; the temptation to advertise standardized services regardless of individual 
need could harm the quality of services, id. at 378–79; policing more calibrated limitations on 
advertising would be too burdensome, id. at 379–80. 
 140. Id. at 372. 
 141. Id. at 374. 
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sophisticated to appreciate the limitations of advertising.142 Invoking 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court repeated its wary view of 
justifications “based on the benefits of public ignorance.”143 
Even after Bates, many states did not immediately comprehend 
or accept the level of constitutional protection afforded lawyer 
advertising. Many state bar associations clung to highly restrictive 
advertising codes.144 Moreover, they were often supported by 
sympathetic local courts that displayed a reluctant acceptance of 
Bates and a narrow conception of its reach.145 Encouraged by Bates’s 
recognition of advertising’s constitutional status, however, lawyers 
pressed the boundaries of state codes and secured the Court’s 
invalidation of a series of restrictions. 
 The provisions struck down in In re R.M.J.146 illustrate the 
organized profession’s resistance to relaxing restrictions appreciably 
beyond the literal demands of Bates. Missouri had forbidden 
attorneys to advertise areas of practice other than in the precise 
language officially prescribed,147 to list the courts in which they were 
admitted to practice,148 and to mail professional announcement cards 
to anyone except specified categories of individuals.149 In a 
unanimous and notably brief opinion, the Court briskly dispatched 
these prohibitions as applied to the attorney who had been charged 
with violating them. The state failed to demonstrate that any part of 
the attorney’s advertising—e.g., describing an area of practice as 
 
 142. See id. at 375. 
 143. Id. at 375 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748, 769–70 (1976)). The Court in Bates rejected the notion that the “public is better 
kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete information.” Id. The Court 
explicitly stated in Virginia Board of Pharmacy that public ignorance only serves to “insulate 
[vendors] from price competition and to open the way for [them] to make a substantial, and 
perhaps even excessive, profit in addition to providing an inferior service.” 425 U.S. at 769. 
 144. See LORI B. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND 
SOLICITATION 43 (1980). 
 145. See, e.g., In re Amendments to Code of Prof’l Responsibility and Canons of Judicial 
Ethics, 637 S.W.2d 589, 604–05 (Ark. 1982); Eaton v. Supreme Court of Ark., 607 S.W.2d 
55, 59–60 (Ark. 1980); In re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary 
Rules on Adver., 647 P.2d 991, 993–94 (Utah 1982); see also Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs, 
518 A.2d 188, 188–89 (N.J. 1986). 
 146. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
 147. Id. at 195 & n.6. 
 148. Id. at 198. 
 149. Id. at 196 (limiting recipients to “lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends 
and relatives”). 
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“real estate” rather than “property”150—was misleading or inherently 
misleading.151 The absence of such a showing signaled to the Court 
that the state could deal with any potential for deception through 
less restrictive means than its categorical prohibitions.152 
The Court’s hostility to suppression of truthful advertising, 
though not its unanimity, continued in Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel.153 Zauderer, an Ohio attorney, had published a 
newspaper advertisement addressed to women who had used the 
Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.154 The advertisement contained a 
drawing of the device and stated the firm’s willingness to represent 
women who had been harmed by it on a contingency-fee basis.155 
The Ohio Supreme Court had held that the advertisement offended 
the state’s disciplinary code on multiple grounds: inclusion of an 
illustration, recommending himself for employment to persons who 
had not sought his legal advice, and “failure to disclose the client’s 
potential liability for costs even if” her suit did not succeed.156 While 
upholding enforcement of the disclosure requirement,157 the Court 
dismissed the state’s remaining two objections to the 
advertisement.158 Since the advice that women had potentially viable 
claims against Dalkon Shield was neither false nor deceptive, the 
state was obligated to demonstrate that banning self-
 
 150. Id. at 205. 
 151. Id. at 206. 
 152. Id. at 206–07. 
 153. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 154. Id. at 630. Zauderer had also been disciplined for placing an advertisement offering 
to represent defendants charged with drunk driving and promising a full refund of the client’s 
legal fee if the client were convicted of this charge. Id. at 629–30. The Ohio Supreme Court 
found the advertisement deceptive because it failed to mention that under plea bargaining, a 
defendant who pleaded to a lesser offense than drunken driving would still be liable for legal 
fees. Id. at 634. The United States Supreme Court rejected Zauderer’s argument that his 
reprimand on this ground violated due process because Ohio’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
had originally found the advertisement in violation of the state’s disciplinary rules on a different 
theory. Id. at 654–55. 
 155. Id. at 630–31. The advertisement asked, “DID YOU USE THIS IUD?” and alerted 
the reader that it might not be too late for those harmed by the device to sue Dalkon Shield. 
Id. 
 156. Id. at 634–35. Zauderer’s acceptance of offers of employment resulting from the 
advertisement was also deemed a separate violation. See id. at 635. 
 157. Id. at 650–53. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the 
Court’s rulings in favor of the state as to the enforcement of disclosure requirements with 
respect to both of Zauderer’s advertisements. Id. at 656–57 (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 158. Id. at 646–47. 
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recommendation based on this advice advanced a substantial state 
interest.159 With three Justices dissenting,160 the majority found all of 
the state’s justifications wanting. The state had not demonstrated, 
and the Court would not assume, that legal advice in this form 
threatened to coerce readers or invade their privacy,161 that a 
prophylactic rule was needed to deter instigation of meritless 
litigation,162 or that legal advertising presented extraordinary 
obstacles to distinguishing deceptive from nondeceptive advertising 
on a case-by-case basis.163 The Court similarly disposed of Ohio’s 
ban on illustrations in attorney advertising. Noting the “important 
communicative functions”164 served by illustrations in advertising, 
the Court refused to credit the state’s “unsupported assertions”165 
that a blanket prohibition was needed to preserve attorneys’ dignity 
or to prevent deception and manipulation.166 
A comparable aversion toward prophylactic rules marked the 
Court’s approach to a wholesale ban on targeted direct-mail 
solicitation in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n.167 The Court observed 
that unlike the inherent potential for overreaching and undue 
influence that justifies prohibition of in-person solicitation,168 a letter 
 
 159. Id. at 639–41. 
 160. Id. at 674 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice 
O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell did not 
participate in the decision. 
 161. Id. at 641–42. 
 162. Id. at 642–44. The Court’s refusal to accept Ohio’s prophylactic rationale 
apparently rested on the fourth part of the Central Hudson test. See id. at 644 (stating that 
restrictions on nondeceptive commercial speech must be “narrowly crafted to serve the State’s 
purpose” and citing Central Hudson). 
 163. Id. at 644–47. 
 164. Id. at 647. 
 165. Id. at 648. 
 166. Id. at 648–49. The Court assumed but did not hold that maintaining attorneys’ 
dignity in their communications with the public constituted a sufficiently substantial interest 
under commercial speech analysis. Id. at 647–48. 
 167. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). The petitioner sought to send to potential clients facing 
foreclosure suits a letter alerting the reader that “you may be about to lose your home,” that 
“[f]ederal law may allow you to keep your home by ORDERING your creditor [sic] to 
STOP,” and that “[i]t may surprise you what I may be able to do for you.” Id. at 469 
(alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court did not resolve 
whether Shapero’s letter was protected. Id. at 479–80 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 480 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 168. Id. at 475 (Brennan, J., plurality) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 
U.S. 447 (1978)). Ohralik is discussed at text accompanying infra notes 189–98. 
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affords ample opportunity for reflection and rejection.169 Even the 
heightened risk of deception posed by personalized letters did not 
support the state’s total ban.170 Regarding the burden from 
individualized review merely as “more work” for a state agency or 
bar association, the Court reiterated its “‘faith that the free flow of 
commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on 
would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the 
false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the 
harmful.’”171 Notably, however, Justice O’Connor, dissenting as she 
had in Zauderer, this time questioned the soundness of the larger 
judicial enterprise launched by Bates.172 She argued that special 
hazards generated by lawyers’ advertising and solicitation, along with 
the ideals of legal professionalism, counseled in favor of broad 
regulatory latitude by states.173 
Justice O’Connor continued to register her opposition to the 
Court’s “micromanagement” of state regulation in Peel v. Attorney 
Registration & Disciplinary Commission,174 where a splintered Court 
nonetheless expanded the bounds of permissible lawyer advertising. 
Peel had been censured for stating on his letterhead that he was 
“certified as a civil trial specialist by the National Board of Trial 
Advocacy” (NBTA).175 A majority of the Court expressed 
disapproval of Illinois’s categorical prohibition of attorneys 
publicizing certification by private organizations. Four Justices, 
speaking through Justice Stevens, considered Peel’s own letterhead 
protected because certification by “bona fide organizations” like the 
NBTA was neither actually nor inherently misleading.176 A fifth 
Justice, Justice Marshall, agreed with the plurality’s characterization 
of the letterhead, but regarded announcements of NBTA 
certification as potentially misleading and therefore susceptible to 
requirements of additional information to clarify the significance of 
 
 169. Id. at 475–76. 
 170. Id. at 476. 
 171. Id. at 478 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 646). The Court also suggested that the 
state’s review could be facilitated by requiring lawyers to file proposed solicitation letters with 
an official agency. Id. at 476. 
 172. Id. at 480–81 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. 
 173. See id. at 485–91. 
 174. 496 U.S. 91, 119 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 93 (Stevens, J., plurality). 
 176. Id. at 110. 
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this credential.177 Justice White shared Justice Marshall’s assessment; 
however, he would not have allowed the excessive scope of Illinois’s 
total ban to preclude the state from forbidding circulation of the 
deficient letterhead.178 Thus, while a majority of the Court would 
have permitted suppression of Peel’s letterhead under a properly 
drawn regulation,179 a larger majority viewed reference to his 
certification as protected when accompanied by an appropriate 
disclaimer. 
Moreover, as the Court’s subsequent holding in Ibanez v. 
Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Board of 
Accountancy180 demonstrated, even the presence of a disclaimer is 
not automatically required in all cases. Ibanez was a practicing 
attorney, also licensed by the state as a Certified Public Accountant 
(CPA) and authorized by a private organization, the Certified 
Financial Planner Board of Standards, to designate herself as a 
“Certified Financial Planner” (CFP).181 The Florida Board of 
Accountancy sought to discipline Ibanez for referring to these 
credentials in her advertising and on her stationery.182 While the 
Court summarily and unanimously dismissed the Board’s objection 
to Ibanez’s use of the CPA designation,183 the question of CFP 
designation evoked extended discussion as well as dissent. The Board 
contended,184 and two Justices agreed,185 that the CFP designation 
was inherently—or at least potentially—misleading because its 
resemblance to the unelaborated CPA designation could lead the 
public to think that it reflected the state’s imprimatur. In the eyes of 
the majority, however, the Board’s failure to substantiate this claim 
militated against its demand for a disclaimer.186 Rather, the status of 
 
 177. Id. at 111–17 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall suggested, for example, 
that a state might require a disclosure that the NBTA operates independently of state and 
federal government.  Id. at 117. 
 178. Id. at 118–19 (White, J., dissenting). 
 179. Justice O’Connor’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. 
Id. at 119.  
 180. 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994). 
 181. Id. at 138. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 143–44 (declaring the Board’s position “entirely insubstantial” and stating 
that “we cannot imagine how consumers can be misled” by Ibanez’s truthful communication 
that she held a CPA license). 
 184. Id. at 144, 146. 
 185. Id. at 150–52 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist). 
 186. Id. at 145–47. 
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“Certified Financial Planner” and “CFP” as “well-established, 
protected federal trademarks”187 proved far more persuasive than the 
meager record on which the Board based its argument.188 
While Ibanez culminated a succession of adverse rulings toward 
lawyer advertising restraints begun by Bates, the Court’s treatment of 
restrictions also featured two conspicuous exceptions to this pattern: 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n189 and Florida Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc.190 Neither decision, however, substantially undermined the 
thrust of the Court’s broader approach to lawyer advertising’s place 
in commercial speech jurisprudence. Instead, both decisions can be 
understood as permitting states to shield potential clients in special 
circumstances that present heightened risks of undue influence and 
other attorney misconduct. 
The Ohralik Court affirmed the state’s authority to prohibit in-
person solicitation of clients “for pecuniary gain, under 
circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to 
prevent.”191 Whatever ambiguity the application of this standard 
might present under other conditions, Ohralik’s egregious behavior 
made for a straightforward resolution of his own case.192 Ohralik had 
approached two young accident victims to solicit them as clients; one 
of them was lying in traction in a hospital when Ohralik asked her to 
sign an agreement that he would represent her.193 In addition, he 
recorded his conversations with both of the young women with a 
concealed tape recorder.194 After both attempted to terminate 
Ohralik’s representation, he sued one of them for breach of contract, 
relying on a recording of their conversation as evidence of the 
agreement.195 In response to complaints filed by both women, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio ultimately suspended Ohralik indefinitely 
from practice for soliciting employment in violation of disciplinary 
 
 187. Id. at 147. 
 188. See id. at 148. The Court noted that a consumer uncertain about the CFP credential 
could contact CFP Board of Standards or simply ask Ibanez to fulfill her obligation under 
Florida Bar rules to provide information on her qualifications to anyone who inquires. Id. at 
145 n.9. 
 189. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
 190. 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
 191. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449. 
 192.  See id. at 449–52. 
 193.  Id. at 450. 
 194.  Id. at 450–51. 
 195. Id. at 452. 
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rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility.196 Finding the 
situation “inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of 
misconduct,” the Court upheld the state’s power to discipline 
lawyers for seeking remunerative employment under circumstances 
likely to involve such improper modes of solicitation.197 Still, the 
Court’s emphasis on the aggressive nature of Ohralik’s conduct, as 
well as its later numerous decisions protecting written forms of 
advertising, indicate that Ohralik represents a discrete and relatively 
modest constraint on attorneys’ freedom to publicize their 
services.198 
Went For It, though a more controversial holding than 
Ohralik,199 appears to carve out an even narrower exception to the 
Court’s pattern of skepticism toward limitations on truthful lawyer 
advertising. The 5–4 decision upheld enforcement of a prohibition 
on personal injury lawyers’ sending targeted direct-mail solicitations 
within thirty days of an accident.200 Admittedly, the majority 
opinion’s willingness to recognize an interest in guarding against 
 
 196. Id. at 453–54. 
 197. Id. at 464. The Court had earlier identified “fraud, undue influence, [and] 
intimidation,” as other forms of “‘vexatious conduct.’” Id. at 462 (quoting Brief for Appellant 
at 25). 
 198. See Martin H. Belsky, The 1994 Term of the Supreme Court and Freedom of Speech, 
31 TULSA L.J. 485, 489–90 (1996); Rodney A. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1, 9–10 (2002). Two other decisions underscore the limits of Ohralik’s reach. In re 
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), involved a lawyer’s written offer of free legal representation by 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in connection with the alleged violation of the 
recipient’s constitutional rights. Overturning the state’s sanction, the Court determined that 
Primus’s solicitation was motivated by her desire to advance the political and civil liberties 
principles of the ACLU rather than by financial gain. Id. at 428–31. Accordingly, in contrast to 
the prophylactic rationale that sufficed in Ohralik, the Primus Court’s more exacting review 
required the state to establish that Primus had actually committed the type of misconduct that 
it wished to deter. Id. at 434–35. In Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993), the Court 
declined to extend Ohralik’s approval of Ohio’s restriction on lawyers’ conduct to Florida’s 
prohibition of in-person solicitation by certified public accountants (CPAs). Id. at 761. 
Because of the differences between Ohralik and Fane in professional training, sophistication of 
the clients whom they approached, and the settings in which solicitation took place, Florida’s 
blanket ban could not be justified as a preventative measure. Id. at 775–76. As in Primus, a 
specific demonstration of misconduct was required. See id. at 776. 
 199. See Amy Busa & Carl G. Sussman, Expanding the Market for Justice: Arguments for 
Extending In-Person Client Solicitation, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 487, 502 (1999) 
(arguing that reasoning in Went For It “is incompatible with precedents like Zauderer, and 
with the more recent Liquormart decision’s heightened scrutiny of restrictions on commercial 
speech”); Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 195 (1995) (“[T]he Court’s  decision in 
[Went For It] represents a clear break from the precedent of Ohralik and Bates.”).  
 200. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995). 
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reputational harm to the legal profession201 furnishes a rationale that, 
viewed in isolation, could justify wider restrictions.202 That interest, 
however, was yoked to the state’s primary aim of keeping “bereaved 
or injured individuals” from suffering a “willful or knowing affront 
to or invasion of [their] tranquility.”203 Disavowing reliance on 
paternalistic motives204 and confining its approval to “the 
circumstances presented here,”205 the Went For It Court does not 
appear to have laid the foundation for revisiting the protective 
premises of its jurisprudence in this area.206 
III. OVERARCHING THEMES 
The course of Supreme Court decisions on commercial speech 
does not form a neat trajectory of successive inevitable outcomes. 
Still, the underlying direction of these decisions has, on balance, 
decidedly favored accenting the expressive function that warrants 
First Amendment recognition over the commercial element that 
excuses regulation. From Virginia Board of Pharmacy to Western 
States Medical Center, the Court has more often than not repulsed 
efforts to restrain otherwise protected communication by relegating 
it to a second-hand category of speech labeled “commercial speech.” 
In general, the Court has carefully scrutinized the government’s 
rationales for restrictions, and has usually found them wanting. In 
particular, the Court has insisted that state attempts to cabin lawyer 
advertising be supported by the strong justifications demanded of 
limitations on other forms of commercial speech. 
A. The Erosion of Separate Status 
While the Court has stopped short of conferring equal dignity on 
commercial speech, the boundary that separates it from “core” 
 
 201. See id. at 630–31. 
 202. See id. at 639–40 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing this interest as amounting to 
“manipulating the public’s opinion by suppressing speech that informs us how the legal system 
works”). 
 203. Id. at 630. 
 204. Id. at 631 n.2. 
 205. Id. at 620. 
 206. See Steven A. Delchin & Sean P. Costello, Show Me Your Wares: The Use of Sexually 
Provocative Ads to Attract Clients, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 64, 97–98 (1999) (noting that 
courts, legislatures, and bar association have generally refused to read the Went For It holding 
broadly). 
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expression under the First Amendment has become increasingly 
blurred. In Virginia Board of Pharmacy the Court echoed a 
previously articulated First Amendment premise (expressed in 
presumably more lofty contexts207) that “people will perceive their 
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that 
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication 
rather than to close them.”208 Indeed, the Court’s opinion in that 
case explicitly invoked decisions involving political speech,209 
distribution of religious literature,210 and civil rights litigation.211 In 
an observation quoted in later decisions, the Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy Court also disputed the notion that commercial speech is 
categorically inferior in value to political expression, asserting that 
“the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial 
information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest 
in the day’s most urgent political debate.”212 Affirming this 
comparison in Bates, the Court then elaborated: 
[S]ignificant societal interests are served by [commercial] speech. 
Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry 
information of import to significant issues of the day. And 
commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, 
nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an 
indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise 
 
 207. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948) ( “The right to speak freely 
and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that 
sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.”); Thornhill v. Alabama 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) 
(“Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all 
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to 
cope with the exigencies of their period.”).  
 208. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 
(1976); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (stating, in course of striking 
down a restriction on solicitation by certified public accountants, that “the general rule is that 
the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information 
presented”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 575 
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“If the First Amendment guarantee means anything, it 
means that, absent clear and present danger, government has no power to restrict expression 
because of the effect its message is likely to have on the public. Our cases indicate that this 
guarantee applies even to commercial speech.” (citation omitted)). 
 209. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)). 
 210. Id. (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)). 
 211. Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)). 
 212. Id. at 763, quoted in Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366–67 
(2002); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1995). 
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system. In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests 
in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.213 
Thus, although the Court has not disavowed the 
“commonsense” distinction between commercial speech and other 
expression,214 Ohralik’s assumption that commercial speech occupies 
a “subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values”215 
appears to operate within an increasingly limited sphere. Went For It, 
too, declared that the Court had “always reserved a lesser degree of 
protection under the First Amendment” for commercial 
advertising.216 It seems no coincidence, however, that these 
pronouncements were issued in cases where a singular constellation 
of factors prompted the Court to deviate from its general pattern of 
protection for truthful lawyer advertising and solicitation.217 
Commercial speech outside of such distinctive enclaves appears to 
enjoy a constitutional stature resembling classically preferred 
expressions of public concern218 far more than “low-level” speech 
like obscenity.219 
The state’s ability to address these special contexts and to curb 
deceptive advertising, then, does not imply a wider license to ignore 
basic First Amendment tenets when regulating other commercial 
speech. On the contrary, a rising chorus of voices on the Court has 
questioned the very premise that commercial speech should be 
governed by wholly separate standards. Justice Thomas, for example, 
 
 213. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (citations omitted), quoted in 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 421 n.17 (1993); see also United 
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001) (stating, in course of invalidating 
compelled assessment to fund advertising for promoting mushroom sales assumed to constitute 
commercial speech, that “speech need not be characterized as political before it receives First 
Amendment protection” (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977))); 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 579 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(comparing tobacco advertisements suggesting pervasive use of tobacco products to 
advertisement trying to “rally support for a political movement”). 
 214. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. 
 215. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
 216. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634–35 (1995). 
 217. See supra notes 189–206 and accompanying text; see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 
U.S. 761, 774 (1993) (“Ohralik’s holding was narrow and depended upon certain ‘unique 
features of in-person solicitation by lawyers’ that were present in the circumstances of that 
case.” (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985))). 
 218. See supra note 15. 
 219. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 
413 U.S. 49, 57–61 (1973). 
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has asserted the absence of any “philosophical or historical basis for 
asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than 
‘noncommercial’ speech,”220 and accordingly has called for strict 
scrutiny whenever “the government seeks to restrict truthful speech 
in order to suppress the ideas it conveys . . . whether or not the 
speech in question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”221 Three 
other Justices, after reciting broad First Amendment safeguards 
against restrictions on speech, declared that “[t]hese basic First 
Amendment principles clearly apply to commercial speech.”222 In 
particular, the decline of Posadas as controlling precedent,223 with its 
sweeping logic that the “greater power” to regulate a commercial 
activity encompasses the “lesser power” to ban advertising about that 
activity,224 has removed a potentially formidable obstacle to robust 
protection for commercial speech. 
B. The Triumph of Antipaternalism 
While the government retains power to restrain genuinely 
deceptive advertising,225 attempts to restrict truthful, nonmisleading 
commercial speech out of fear of misguided consumer reactions have 
come to trigger a virtual per se rule of invalidity. The Court 
emphatically voiced this antipaternalistic stance at the outset of its 
modern commercial speech jurisprudence, denouncing Virginia’s ban 
on advertising prescription drug prices as an effort to shield 
presumably impressionable consumers from information that they 
would probably abuse.226 Reviewing Virginia Board of Pharmacy two 
decades later, Justice Stevens described the decision’s animating 
principle: “[A] State’s paternalistic assumption that the public will 
use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information unwisely cannot 
 
 220. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 221. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (asserting that statute barring accurate communication of alcoholic content of 
malt beverages “should be subjected to the same stringent review as any other content-based 
abridgment of protected speech”). 
 222. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 501, 512 (Stevens, J., plurality). 
 223. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 224. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345–46 (1986). 
 225. See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 226. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
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justify a decision to suppress it.”227 Similarly, in Linmark,228 the 
Court forbade the Township Council to ban home sale signs out of 
fear that “homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the 
Council views as the homeowners’ self-interest and the corporate 
interest of the township.”229 The Court recognized that such 
authority would have empowered communities everywhere to 
suppress communication of facts adverse to their image “so long as a 
plausible claim can be made that disclosure would cause the 
recipients of the information to act ‘irrationally.’”230 Later, in 44 
Liquormart, this concern was generalized into the observation that 
bans on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech “usually rest 
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond 
‘irrationally’ to the truth.”231 The belief that “[t]he First Amendment 
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep 
people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their 
own good”232 also informed the outcome in Western States Medical 
Center.233 Exercising this skepticism, the Court “rejected the notion 
that the Government has an interest in preventing the dissemination 
of truthful commercial information in order to prevent members of 
the public from making bad decisions” with information about 
compounded drugs.234 
The Court has invalidated other commercial speech restrictions 
on the basis of the state’s condescending estimate of the capacities of 
its citizens. In Bates,235 for example, the Court disparaged Arizona’s 
argument that advertising provides an incomplete basis for choosing 
an attorney as “assum[ing] that the public is not sophisticated 
enough to realize the limitations of advertising.”236 The Court 
ultimately rejected this argument, which it suspected rested on an 
“underestimation of the public,” as a basis for totally banning lawyer 
 
 227. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 497 (Stevens, J., plurality). 
 228. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 229. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977). 
 230. Id. 
 231. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 503 (Stevens, J., plurality); see also id. at 526 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating position that “all attempts to dissuade legal choices by 
citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible”). 
 232. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 375 (2002) (citation omitted). 
 233. See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text. 
 234. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 374. 
 235. See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text. 
 236. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374–75 (1977). 
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advertising.237 Similarly, in Peel,238 Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion 
sharply rejected the State’s “paternalistic assumption” that readers of 
Peel’s letterhead would not distinguish between a private 
organization’s certification and official state endorsement.239 Greater 
New Orleans240 invoked the converse of this impermissible 
assumption, basing its invalidation of broadcast restrictions on the 
“presumption that the speaker and the audience, not the 
Government, should be left to assess the value of accurate and 
nonmisleading information about lawful conduct.”241 Even the 
otherwise accommodating Went For It Court242 cast its earlier 
holding in Bolger243 as a rejection of “the Federal Government’s 
paternalistic effort to ban potentially ‘offensive’ and ‘intrusive’ direct-
mail advertisements for contraceptives.”244 
C. The Invigoration of Central Hudson’s Tailoring Test 
For a time, some incongruity existed between the literal rigor of 
the fourth part of the Central Hudson test—requiring that 
regulations of commercial speech not be “more extensive than is 
necessary to serve . . . [the government’s] interest”245—and the more 
relaxed construction suggested by Fox.246 The predominant manner 
in which the Court has described and applied this standard, however, 
indicates that a potent version has prevailed. Even if not fully 
equivalent to the least-restrictive-means test that the Court has 
applied in other contexts,247 Central Hudson’s final prong now 
 
 237. Id. at 375. 
 238. See supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text. 
 239. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n., 496 U.S. 91, 105 & n.13 
(1990) (opinion of Stevens, J.); see also Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t. of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. 
of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994) (refusing to accept state’s unsupported contention 
that lawyer’s truthful communication of status as Certified Financial Planner was potentially 
misleading to clients). 
 240. See supra notes 100–09 and accompanying text. 
 241. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195 (1999). 
 242. See supra notes 199–206 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 244. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 630 (1995). 
 245. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980).  
 246. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
 247. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (striking 
down blanket prohibition of indecent interstate commercial telephone messages because denial 
of adult access to telephone messages that were indecent but not obscene exceeded what was 
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mandates that states carefully tailor regulation of commercial speech 
to the interest that evoked it. 
In a sense, the Court has simply placed renewed emphasis on the 
principle stated elsewhere in Central Hudson that “if the 
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited 
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot 
survive.”248 The Western State Medical Center Court, underscoring 
that Central Hudson’s standard is “significantly stricter” than the 
rational basis test,249 explained that “if the Government could 
achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that 
restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”250 In Greater New 
Orleans, the Court spoke of the government’s obligation to show 
“narrow tailoring” of the regulation to the asserted interest;251 the 
Discovery Network Court referred to its consideration of “less drastic 
measures” by which the city could achieve its goals.252 While the 
language in these and other cases253 varies, their similar outcomes 
demonstrate the typically fatal result when plausible, less speech-
restrictive alternatives exist. 
In conducting its review, the Court has found a variety of 
measures to serve as sufficient alternatives to the state’s outright ban. 
In the case of lawyer advertising, the Court has repeatedly expressed 
its preference for disclaimers or other disclosures to prevent the 
misleading effect that the state has sought to avert through barring 
certain advertising altogether. Even as the Court sustained the 
plaintiffs’ challenge to Arizona’s broad ban in Bates, it took pains to 
note the possibility that “some limited supplementation, by way of 
 
necessary to limit access of minors to such messages); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. 
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (striking down state’s denial of 
unemployment compensation benefits to claimant who quit his job because his religious beliefs 
forbade participation in production of armaments); Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist 
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 186 (1979) (striking down state’s requirement that new political 
parties and independent candidates obtain more than 25,000 signatures on nominating 
petitions if person was seeking office that would serve less than the entire state). 
 248. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
 249. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (citation omitted). 
 250. Id. at 371. 
 251. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).  
 252. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993). 
 253. See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 
U.S. 136, 142 (1994) (requiring state to show that a restriction on commercial speech 
“directly and materially advances a substantial state interest in a manner no more extensive 
than necessary to serve that interest”). 
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warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required of even an 
advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure that the 
consumer is not misled.”254 In Zauderer, the Court pointed to 
“disclosure requirements [that] are reasonably related to the State’s 
interest in preventing deception of consumers,”255 as “one of the 
acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual suppression of 
speech.”256 Following this principle, a majority of Justices in Peel 
favored a disclaimer, where appropriate, to clarify a lawyer’s 
certification by a private organization over a categorical prohibition 
on communicating this credential.257 
In other areas of commercial speech as well, the Court has 
looked to the efficacy of additional speech as a means of combating 
dangers that the state has addressed through censorship. In Central 
Hudson itself, the Court suggested that the state might advance its 
interest in energy conservation by directing Central Hudson to 
supplement its promotion of an electric service with information 
about the service’s relative expense and efficiency.258 In addition, the 
state itself is not powerless to add its own voice. For example, the 
Linmark Court noted opportunities for the city to promote 
integrated housing through expression to counter the feared effects 
of the “For Sale” signs that it had tried to forbid—e.g., continuing 
its “process of education” and publicizing the number of white 
residents remaining in the township.259 
In addition to disclosures and official counterspeech, the Court 
has also identified a number of nonspeech measures through which 
the government could discourage behavior that it had sought to 
dampen by limiting access to information. As noted earlier, the 
Greater New Orleans Court discussed numerous regulations of 
conduct that could reduce the ills associated with casino gambling as 
substitutes for the ban on broadcasting promotional 
 
 254. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). 
 255.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 256. Id. at 651 n.14. 
 257. See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., plurality); id. at 117 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 118 (White, J., dissenting); 
see also Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146 (reserving question of whether “in other situations or on a 
different record, the Board's insistence on a disclaimer might serve as an appropriately tailored 
check against deception or confusion”). 
 258. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 447 U.S. 557, 570–71 (1980).  
 259. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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advertisements.260 Likewise, the Western States Medical Center Court 
could conceive a host of ways that the government could confront 
the dangers posed by compounded drugs before resorting to 
prohibition of advertising.261 Perhaps most direct and obvious was 
the Court’s observation in Rubin that the government’s concern 
with the prospect of strength wars among brewers could be 
addressed by simply limiting the alcohol content of beers.262 
Nor do these steps exhaust the range of satisfactory alternatives 
to completely barring allegedly problematic commercial speech. For 
example, the Linmark Court noted that a community concerned 
about abandonment of neighborhoods could offer financial 
incentives for people to retain their homes.263 In Shapero, the Court 
recognized that having lawyers file targeted direct-mail solicitation 
letters with a state agency would constitute a “far less restrictive and 
more precise means” of dealing with potential abuses and mistakes 
than wholesale suppression.264 That reasoning was reminiscent of the 
Court’s response to Virginia’s concerns about the impact of price 
advertising on the professional standards of pharmacists—viz., that 
the state was capable of maintaining those standards through direct 
regulation.265 Moreover, the Court has been prepared to have 
consumers themselves assume some responsibility for assessing 
commercial speech. When Justice O’Connor objected that 
consumers could not verify Ibanez’s Certified Financial Planner’s 
credentials,266 the Court responded that they could call the CFP 
Board of Standards for this information.267 
 
 260. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra note 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 582 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (asserting that “if the perceived harm associated with greater electrical 
usage is not sufficiently serious to justify direct regulation,” the suppression of promotional 
advertising is not justified). 
 263. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 97. 
 264. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988). 
 265. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
768–69 (1976).  
 266. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 
136, 150 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 267. Id. at 145 n.9. 
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D. The Burden of Demonstration 
Much of the potency of the Court’s review of commercial speech 
regulation stems from the level of proof that has been demanded of 
the state. In conducting this analysis, the Court has taken seriously 
the principle that “‘[t]he party seeking to uphold a restriction on 
commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it.’”268 The 
burden of showing that the restriction is carefully designed to 
address a demonstrable harm has frequently proved an 
insurmountable barrier for the government. 
In some cases, the government has failed even to satisfy the 
Court that “the harms it recites are real,”269 much less that the 
limitation on commercial speech is properly tailored to meet them. 
In Linmark, the record did not establish the existence of substantial 
panic selling by white homeowners, a necessary predicate to the 
township’s ban on “For Sale” signs as a means of slowing this 
phenomenon.270 Similarly, attempts to restrict lawyer advertising 
have often foundered on the Court’s refusal to “allow rote 
invocation of the words ‘potentially misleading’”271 to substitute for 
actual evidence of harmful effects. Thus, even while conceding that 
the conspicuous listing of membership in the Bar of the Supreme 
Court of the United States was potentially misleading, the R.M.J. 
Court rejected Missouri’s attempt to ban it absent a credible finding 
that the public would be misled by this information.272 In Ibanez, the 
state had not “shouldered the burden it must carry” to prohibit 
Ibanez’s references to her status as a CPA and CFP because it had 
not “demonstrated with sufficient specificity that any member of the 
public could have been misled by Ibanez’ [sic] constitutionally 
protected speech or that any harm could have resulted from allowing 
that speech to reach the public’s eyes.”273 This assessment of the 
record was echoed by Peel’s plurality opinion, which, finding no 
supporting evidence, refused to credit the claim that communicating 
 
 268. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983)); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999) (“[T]he Government bears the burden of 
identifying a substantial interest and justifying the challenged restriction.”). 
 269. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771. 
 270. Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977). 
 271. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146. 
 272. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 205–06 (1982). 
 273. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 138–39. 
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National Board of Trial Advocacy certification would convey an 
exaggerated notion of its holder’s qualification.274 
By extension, the Court has also demanded a persuasive 
evidentiary showing to meet Central Hudson’s third requirement 
that a restraint on commercial speech directly advance a substantial 
governmental interest. In marked contrast to the generous 
assumptions of the rational relationship standard,275 the Court has 
repeatedly refused to allow this burden to be satisfied by “mere 
speculation or conjecture.”276 The state must “show[] that the 
restriction directly and materially advances a substantial state 
interest”277 when addressing harms by limiting commercial speech, 
the state “must demonstrate that . . . its restriction will in fact 
alleviate them to a material degree.”278 Thus, in Edenfield, the 
absence of studies or other supporting evidence led the Court to 
conclude that the state had “not demonstrated that . . . the ban on 
CPA solicitation advances its asserted interests in any direct and 
material way.”279 In 44 Liquormart, the state’s failure to put forward 
evidence of the utility of suppressing advertisement of retail liquor 
prices likewise prompted disagreement with the state’s contention 
that the ban would “significantly advance the State’s interest in 
promoting temperance.”280 An absence of evidence has therefore 
 
 274. Peel v. Attorney Registration. & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 102 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., plurality). 
 275. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (stating that rational basis standard 
“permits a court to hypothesize interests that might support legislative distinctions, whereas 
heightened scrutiny limits the realm of justification to demonstrable reality”); FCC v. Beach 
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (stating that under rational basis review, the 
burden is upon the challenging party to disprove existence of “any reasonably conceivable state 
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification”); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore 
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (stating that under rational basis review, those 
attacking rationality of legislative classification have the burden “to negative every conceivable 
basis which might support it.” (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))). 
 276. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993). Three other cases that quote this 
phrase from Edenfield are Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 
188 (1999); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995); and Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 
143. See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 
(1980) (rejecting asserted link between advertising ban and equity of utility’s rate structure as 
“highly speculative”). 
 277. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added). 
 278. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771(emphasis added). 
 279. Id. 
 280. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
plurality); see also Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95–96 (1977) 
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generated the default inference that the state has not met its burden. 
In striking down Massachusetts’s point-of-sale advertising 
regulations in Lorillard,281 the Court explained that “[a] regulation 
cannot be sustained if it ‘provides only ineffective or remote support 
for the government’s purpose,’ or if there is ‘little chance’ that the 
restriction will advance the State’s goal.” 282  
Finally, the fourth and most stringent aspect of Central Hudson’s 
test, barring restrictions more extensive than necessary to serve the 
state’s interest,283 also presents the most imposing evidentiary 
burden. The state must show that less restrictive alternatives that 
occur to the Court will not adequately advance the state’s goal—a 
difficult if not impossible challenge if the state has not already 
experimented with such measures. In Central Hudson itself, the ban 
on promotional advertising foundered on the state’s failure to 
“demonstrate[] that its interest in conservation cannot be protected 
adequately by more limited regulation” of the utility’s commercial 
expression.284 By the same token, the outdoor advertising regulations 
for smokeless tobacco and cigars in Lorillard fell because the 
Massachusetts Attorney General had “failed to show” that they did 
not restrict speech more than was necessary to further the state’s 
interest in preventing underage tobacco use.285 In Western States 
Medical Center, again, the government did not meet its evidentiary 
burden—viz., to show that the Court’s suggested alternatives to the 
prohibition on advertising compounded drugs would be insufficient 
to prevent the harm at which the ban was aimed.286 
 
(“[T]he record does not confirm the township’s assumption that proscribing [‘For Sale’] signs 
will reduce public awareness of realty sales and thereby decrease public concern over selling.”). 
 281. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text. 
 282. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 566 (2001) (quoting Edenfield, 507 
U.S. at 770). 
 283. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 284. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 570 
(1980); see also id. at 571 (refusing to approve total ban on utility’s advertising “[i]n the 
absence of a showing that more limited speech regulation would be ineffective” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 285. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 565. 
 286. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002). 
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E. The Rejection of Legal Exceptionalism 
If the profusion of cases involving lawyer advertising has molded 
the subject “into its own distinct area of common law,”287 that area is 
not distinguished by exemption from the application of larger 
principles governing commercial speech. On the contrary, the 
frequent invalidation of restrictions that began with Bates has flowed 
from the Court’s refusal to treat attorney advertising as an altogether 
different species from advertising of other goods or services. It is one 
thing for the Court to take into account the particular nature of legal 
services when considering regulation of lawyer advertising.288 
However, the argument that the special dynamics of the practice of 
law warrant suspension of ordinary commercial speech analysis has, 
on the whole, been a minority position within the Court.289 More 
representative of majority sentiment was the Court’s rebuff to Ohio’s 
attempt to suppress Zauderer’s advertisement: “The State’s 
contention that the problem of distinguishing deceptive and 
nondeceptive legal advertising is different in kind from the problems 
presented by advertising generally is unpersuasive.”290 
Thus, the Court has routinely assumed that regulation of lawyer 
advertising is reviewed within the framework of the Central Hudson 
standard.291 In particular, lawyer advertising has not been spared the 
rigorous version of Central Hudson’s fourth prong discussed 
 
 287. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 7, at 630. 
 288. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (“[B]ecause the 
public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked 
or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal 
advertising.”). 
 289. See, e.g., Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 487 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“The roots of the error in our attorney advertising cases are a defective analogy 
between professional services and standardized consumer products and a correspondingly 
inappropriate skepticism about the States’ justifications for their regulations.”); Bates, 433 U.S. 
at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[P]rice advertising can never 
give the public an accurate picture on which to base its selection of an attorney.”). 
 290. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 644 (1985). But see Fla. 
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (“[P]articularly because the standards and 
conduct of state-licensed lawyers have traditionally been subject to extensive regulation by the 
States, it is all the more appropriate that we limit our scrutiny of state regulations to a level 
commensurate with the ‘subordinate position’ of commercial speech in the scale of First 
Amendment values.” (citation omitted)). As discussed earlier, however, Went For It represents 
an exception to the trend in the Court’s decisions concerning lawyer advertising. See supra 
notes 199–202 and accompanying text. 
 291. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637–38; In re R.M.J., 455 
U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:11 PM 
1221 Persistence of Bans on Subjective Lawyer Advertising 
 1261 
earlier.292 In addition to the examples previously noted,293 the R.M.J. 
Court pointed out that the state might address the potential abuses 
arising from general mailings of announcement cards by supervising 
them rather than confining their circulation; the state’s restriction 
therefore failed Central Hudson’s requirement because there was “no 
indication in the record of a failed effort to proceed along such a less 
restrictive path.”294 The state’s “unsupported assertions” in Zauderer 
of the dangers of illustrations in lawyer advertising likewise proved 
unavailing in the absence of evidence that abuses “cannot be 
combated by any means short of a blanket ban.”295 Whatever the 
merits, then, of Justice O’Connor’s lament that the Court “took a 
wrong turn” with Bates and that it “has compounded this error by 
finding increasingly unprofessional forms of attorney advertising to 
be protected speech,”296 it has failed to persuade the Court that 
restrictions on lawyer advertising should receive relaxed scrutiny.297 
IV. THE INVALIDITY OF BANS ON SELF-LAUDATORY CLAIMS AND 
FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT PROHIBITIONS  
Viewed through the prism of the Supreme Court’s principles 
governing commercial speech generally and lawyer advertising in 
particular, wholesale bans on self-laudatory advertising claims by 
attorneys appear to be insupportable. And indeed, the number of 
states expressly forbidding such claims has plummeted in recent 
years.298 Nevertheless, courts that approved prohibitions on self-
laudatory advertising have, by and large, refrained from repudiating 
these precedents. That reasoning is therefore presumably available to 
 
 292. See supra Part III.C. 
 293. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text. 
 294. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 206. 
 295. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648. 
 296. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 778 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 297. For the argument that the state has less reason to regulate clients’ selection of 
attorneys than their choice of products, see Andrews, supra note 135, at 995 (“The quality of 
professional services is itself regulated initially by the bar exam and then by the state ethics 
codes and thus, if a client does choose an attorney for the wrong reasons, there are independent 
reasons to suppose that the attorney will do an adequate job.”). 
 298. In 1985, provisions in twenty–seven states could be identified. See Scott Makar, 
Note, Advertising Legal Services: The Case for Quality and Self-Laudatory Claims, 37  U. FLA. 
L. REV. 969, 1002 n.204 (1985). A search conducted in 2009 disclosed three explicit 
prohibitions. See IND. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 7.2(b) (2007); S.C. APP. CT. R. 7.2(f) (2008); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16–18-appx-7.1(c)(3) (2009). 
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sustain restrictions that reach substantially the same type of 
advertising at which bans on self-laudatory claims were aimed. A 
prominent example of this type of provision treats as proscribable 
false or misleading communication that “compares the lawyer’s 
services with other lawyers’ services, unless the comparison can be 
factually substantiated.”299 An examination of the flaws in 
prohibitions of self-laudatory claims suggests that categorically 
forbidding comparisons is similarly vulnerable to challenge.  
A. The Unfocused Opposition to Self-Laudatory Advertising 
The tenuous constitutionality of bans on lawyers’ self-laudatory 
communications arises in part from their indeterminacy. Just as the 
Court noted in Zauderer that Ohio’s rule against self-
recommendation could theoretically bar all advertising,300 so might 
prohibitions of self-laudation be construed as reaching all 
information about an attorney—however accurate and pertinent—
that reflects well on the attorney.301 Presumably, however, states do 
not contemplate such a patently impermissible sweep. Rather, these 
bans appear to reflect a concern that self-laudation in some instances 
can lead potential clients astray by presenting exaggerated or 
unverifiable claims about an attorney’s competence.302 For this 
reason, though, it is difficult to isolate an independent set of harmful 
self-laudatory communications apart from those that can plausibly be 
described as false, deceptive, or misleading. Rather, the designation 
 
 299. COLO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(a) (2008); FLA. BAR REG. R. 4-7.2(c)(1)(I) 
(2008); GA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(a)(3) (2008); HAW. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 7.1(c) (2008); IDAHO RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) (2006); ILL. RULES PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) (2008); KAN. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 226:7.1(c) (2007); KY. SUP. 
CT. R. 3.130(7.15)(c) (2008); MD. LAWYER’S RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) (2008); 
MICH. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) (2008); MINN. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) 
(2005); MISS. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(d) (2008); MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-7.1(e) (2007); 
NEV. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) (2008); N.H. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) 
(2008); N.J. COURT RULES, RPC 7.1(a)(3) (2008); N.C. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
7.1(a)(3) (2008); N.D. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) (2008); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8 § 
7.1(c) (2008); VT. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(c) (2008); VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 6, § II, 
7.1(a)(3); W. VA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 7.1(c) (2008); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:7.1(c) (2008); 
WYO. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 7.1(c) (2008). 
 300. 471 U.S. at 639. 
 301. See Linda Sorenson Ewald, Content Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: An Era of 
Change, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 429, 481 (1990) (“[S]ome might regard advertisements 
which focus on the lawyer’s qualifications, experiences, or clientele as self-laudatory.”). 
 302. See infra notes 319–26 and accompanying text. 
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seems to function largely as a catchall term for claims that cannot be 
verified, and that may be objectionable on more specific grounds. 
The indefinite scope of bans on self-laudatory expression is 
reflected by the statutes in which the prohibition appears. In Indiana, 
for example, self-laudation is not singled out in an independent 
proscription; rather, it appears in the disjunctive under a broader rule 
against using “public communication containing a false, fraudulent, 
misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair statement or 
claim.”303 The dominant concern with the other elements 
enumerated in this provision is apparent from reported cases. 
Conduct for which the provision has been invoked to justify 
discipline includes a lawyer’s maintaining a website suggesting that 
parents of special needs children lie to school officials during 
mediation,304 issuance of a misleading press release,305 
misrepresentation of the racial composition of a firm in a billboard 
promoting the firm’s diversity,306 issuance of a false and misleading 
press advisory concerning his retention in a suit,307 misrepresentation 
of a firm’s identity,308 and a prosecutor’s sham employment of a 
deputy prosecutor to operate the prosecutor’s private law practice.309  
Even where the conduct involved might be broadly characterized 
as self-laudation, it has frequently assumed a form that makes it 
susceptible to narrower prohibitions imposed by the state. In some 
instances—in both Indiana and elsewhere—the gravamen of the 
charge appears to be the attorney’s dubious citation to past 
performance to assure future results. One group of attorneys, for 
example, sponsored an advertisement stating that they “offer[ed] the 
track record and resources you need to win a settlement.”310 In 
another case, a firm’s television commercials featured testimonials of 
past clients, which, in the court’s view, may have “create[d] 
unjustified expectations of similar outcomes in the future without 
taking into account the peculiarities of the particular cases.”311 
 
 303. IND. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2(b) (2007). 
 304. In re Philpot, 820 N.E.2d 141, 141 (Ind. 2005). 
 305. In re Boesch, 816 N.E.2d 414, 414 (Ind. 2004). 
 306. In re Gerling, 777 N.E.2d 1097, 1097–98 (Ind. 2002). 
 307. In re Allen, 783 N.E.2d 1118, 1120–21 (Ind. 2002). 
 308. In re Foos, 770 N.E.2d 335, 336–37 (Ind. 2002). 
 309. In re Riddle, 700 N.E.2d 788, 791–92 (Ind. 1998). 
 310. In re Anonymous, 689 N.E.2d 442, 444 (Ind. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). 
 311. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shane, 692 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Ohio 1998). The 
Shane court noted that “[c]omments about past successes may create unjustified expectations 
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In some instances where a disputed communication could be cast 
as “purely” self-laudatory, other considerations may sometimes bear 
on a court’s decision to impose discipline. In Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. 
Mandello,312 for example, the court designated as self-laudatory the 
following statement made by an attorney to a potential client: “‘I 
would like to represent you and feel that my background provides 
me with a strong basis of knowledge with which to protect your 
interests . . . .’”313 While this assertion furnished grounds for finding 
a violation of the ban on self-laudatory communications,314 the 
context of the statement appears to present the most troubling 
aspect of Mandello’s conduct. Mandello made the statement in a 
letter sent to a widow whose husband’s death in a local hospital 
Mandello attributed to gross negligence.315 Moreover, the letter also 
expressed Mandello’s belief that “‘God has reasons for everything 
and if it is in his perfect plan that I represent you, then he will 
provide the means.’”316 In light of the widow’s subsequent dismissal 
of her current attorney in favor of Mandello,317 the case thus 
displayed elements of overreaching that prompted the Court’s 
approval of restrictions in Orhalik318 and Went For It.319 
Admittedly, in some instances the essence of attorney advertising 
that triggers disciplinary proceedings can be viewed as self-laudatory 
in the sense that it offers a subjectively favorable portrayal of the 
lawyer’s services. The statements in Capoccia v. Committee on 
Professional Standards, Third Judicial Department, State of New 
York320 and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Furth321 illustrate this 
 
of similar outcomes in the future without taking into account the peculiarities of the particular 
cases.” Id.; see also In re Benkie, 892 N.E.2d 1237, 1239–40 (Ind. 2008) (brochure describing 
prior successful representations); In re Coale, 775 N.E.2d 1079, 1080–81 (Ind. 2002) 
(attorneys’ materials referring to their success in other disaster-related litigation); In re Allen, 
783 N.E.2d at 1120 (Ind. 2002) (lawyer’s press release referring to previous verdicts obtained 
in transportation-related accidents, including statistical data and past success, deemed “an 
implied indication of future success”). 
 312. 32 S.W.3d 763 (Ky. 2000). 
 313. Id. at 765. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 763–64. 
 316. Id. at 764. 
 317. Id. 
 318. See supra notes 189–98 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra notes 199–206 and accompanying text. 
 320. 1990 WL 211189, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1990). 
 321. 754 N.E.2d 219 (Ohio 2001).  
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phenomenon. The complaint in Capoccia was based on the 
attorney’s commercial referring to him as a “‘smart, tough 
lawyer.’”322 Similarly, Furth’s website description of the attorney as a 
“‘passionate and aggressive advocate’”323 was deemed to constitute 
an impermissibly self-laudatory statement.324 A more generic 
representation violating a ban on self-laudation occurred in Florida 
Bar v. Lange, where the attorney’s Yellow Pages advertisement had 
stated, “When the Best is Simply Essential.”325 It is easy to appreciate 
why these and comparable claims326 would arouse the opposition of 
the organized bar. As the remainder of this Part argues, however, the 
concerns raised by such statements do not justify blanket bans on 
self-laudation or variations of such prohibitions. 
B. The Clash with Commercial Speech Doctrine 
Bans on self-laudation and similar prohibitions on lawyer 
advertising, then, are bottomed on the danger of exposing the public 
to claims of competence that cannot be objectively verified. 
Ultimately, this rationale must rely on the observation in Bates that 
claims relating to the quality of legal services “probably are not 
susceptible of precise measurement or verification and, under some 
circumstances, might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, 
or even false.”327 Extrapolating this qualified dicta to authorize 
categorical suppression of subjective representations of quality, 
however, is in tension with the larger principles that the Court has 
developed to govern commercial speech. Such blanket bans are 
rooted in dubious premises about the capacity of consumers, the 
validity of prophylactic measures, the level of justification required, 
and the singularity of attorney advertising. 
 
 322. Capoccia, 1990 WL 211189, at *2 (quoting advertisement as stating, “‘If you’ve 
been injured you deserve a fast fair cash compensation . . . Andrew Capoccia understands, he’s 
a smart tough lawyer who’s on your side’”). 
 323.  Furth, 754 N.E.2d at 225. 
 324. Id. at 231–32. 
 325. Fla. Bar v. Lange, 711 So. 2d 518, 521 (Fla. 1998). 
 326. See, e.g., Medina County Bar Ass’n v. Grieselhuber, 678 N.E.2d 535, 536–37 (Ohio 
1997) (lawyer’s Yellow Pages advertisement stating “‘We Do It Well’” found to violate rule 
against communication of claims that could not be verified). 
 327. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1977). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:11 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1266 
1. The paternalistic character of bans on self-laudation 
If sweeping bans on lawyers’ self-laudatory advertising have any 
coherent explanation, it is the public’s presumed inability to assess 
representations about legal services that cannot be factually 
corroborated.328 Indeed, judicial disapproval of attorney advertising 
that is not confined to objectively demonstrable information often 
includes expressions of solicitude for gullible or irrational consumers. 
This low estimate of the reasoning faculties of citizens, however, is 
difficult to reconcile with the powerful antipaternalistic impulse that 
 
 328. Some courts have also indicated that limitations on lawyer advertising are largely 
rooted in concerns about lawyers’ professionalism and the dignity of attorneys. See, e.g., Fla. 
Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240, 246–47 (Fla. 2005) (justifying ban on lawyer’s use of logo of pit 
bull with spiked collar and “pit bull” in telephone number as, in part, “one step we can take to 
maintain the dignity of lawyers”); The Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the 
Fla. Bar—Adver. Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 475 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (questioning validity of certain restrictions on lawyer advertising adopted by 
the Florida Supreme Court as “only regulat[ing] decorum”); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 
Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Iowa 1985) 
(explaining prohibition of lawyers’ television advertisements that “contain background sound, 
visual displays, more than a single, nondramatic voice or self-laudatory statements” as part of 
effort to draw line between “the dissemination of protected information and crass personal 
promotion”); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Humphrey, 355 
N.W.2d 565, 572 (Iowa 1984) (Larson, J., dissenting) (criticizing certain restrictions on 
content of attorney advertising as unconstitutional effort to stem “perceived assault on the 
‘professionalism’ of the bar”), vacated, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985); Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs, 
518 A.2d 188, 193 (N.J. 1986) (noting concern raised by attorney advertising that legal 
profession “will degenerate into just another trade”); id. at 196 (expressing concern that 
lawyer’s advertisement employing “attention-getting technique . . . has the  potential for 
bringing both the bar and bench into disrepute”); In re Petition for Rule of Court Governing 
Lawyer Adver., 564 S.W.2d 638, 644 (Tenn. 1978) (asserting that lawyers’ advertising 
“should be conducted with decorum” and that handbill, circular and billboard advertising is 
“beneath the dignity of the profession”); In re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of 
Changes in Disciplinary Rules on Adver., 647 P.2d 991, 993 (Utah 1982) (urging that rules 
governing lawyer advertising “guard against the making of common, cheap or undignified 
claims and  . . . harmonize with the purpose of maintaining . . . high standards of dignity and 
professionalism”).  
Rodney Smolla has argued convincingly, however, that limitations on lawyer advertising 
designed to protect the dignity of attorneys cannot justify restrictions on truthful, 
nonmisleading advertising. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Lawyer Advertising and the Dignity 
of the Profession, 59 ARK. L. REV. 437 (2006); see also Grievance Comm. for Hartford-New 
Britain Judicial Dist. v. Trantolo, 470 A.2d 228, 234 (Conn. 1984) (protecting arguably 
“distasteful” but truthful lawyer advertising); In re Marcus, 320 N.W.2d 806, 808–10, 816 
(Wis. 1982); id. at 817 (Beilfuss, C.J., concurring) (belief that lawyers’ advertisements were 
“degrading and lack the sense of professionalism we should expect of lawyers” deemed 
insufficient to ban them). This Article accepts Smolla’s thesis as its premise and focuses on the 
notion that self-laudatory advertising tends to mislead potential clients. 
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has characterized the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence since 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy. 
Courts that resist deviations from dry recitation of established 
facts in lawyer advertising often state the necessity of rescuing the 
public from its inability to evaluate subjective claims. Without the 
protective cloak of state-enforced restrictions, the lay audience will 
presumably succumb to ingenious appeals to its emotional and 
irrational tendencies. Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court instructed 
the bar to “examine lawyers’ advertisements to determine whether, 
taken as a whole, they are predominately informational or are simply 
emotional, irrational sales pitches;”329 the latter deprives consumers 
of the ability to “mak[e] informed, rational choices of counsel.”330 
Similarly seeking to shield hapless consumers, a federal court 
endorsed “strict, self-imposed controls” over lawyer advertising.331 
Otherwise, unrestrained advertising would “encourage extravagant, 
artful, self-laudatory brashness in seeking business and thus could 
mislead the layman.”332 This conception of consumers as putty in the 
hands of manipulative lawyers rather than rational, autonomous 
individuals was captured by the Tennessee Supreme Court when, in a 
decision that pre-dated Peel, it upheld a broad ban on lawyers’ 
advertising areas of specialization.333 Such restrictions, the court 
announced, were needed to ensure that “the public is not victimized 
by any form of advertising that has the effect of a holding out to the 
public of special or unique qualification or expertise.”334 To a naïve 
and uncomprehending public, communication of the impression that 
a lawyer possesses a particular expertise would inevitably be 
“deceptive and misleading.”335  
The tacit operation of this condescending philosophy can be 
observed in the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Bar v. 
Pape.336 There, the court upheld discipline for two personal injury 
attorneys who placed television advertising featuring their firm’s pit 
 
 329. In re Zang, 741 P.2d 267, 279 (Ariz. 1987). 
 330. See id. 
 331. Lovett & Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903, 909 (D.R.I. 1981). 
 332. Id. at 908. 
 333. In re Petition for Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Adver., 564 S.W.2d 638, 644–
45 (Tenn. 1978). 
 334. Id. at 645. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Fla. Bar v. Pape, 918 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2005). 
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bull logo and pit bull telephone number.337 While the opinion 
principally addressed the affront that this imagery posed to the 
dignity of the legal profession,338 the court also faulted the 
commercial’s use of the logo and phone number for “not 
convey[ing] objectively relevant information about the attorneys’ 
practice.”339 The basis for this conclusion was the commercial’s 
absence of any “indication that [the attorneys] specialize in either 
dog bite cases generally or in litigation arising from attacks by pit 
bulls specifically.”340 The Court contrasted the attorneys’ commercial 
with the illustration of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device in 
Zauderer, which had been found to be “‘an accurate 
representation . . . and ha[ve] no features that are likely to deceive, 
mislead, or confuse the reader.’”341 The notion that viewers would 
suffer confusion over the pit bull theme—that they would interpret it 
as anything other than the attorneys’ holding themselves out as 
tenaciously pursuing their clients’ claims342—seems at odds with the 
assumptions of consumer intelligence and rationality underpinning 
modern commercial speech doctrine. 
Also in tension with this antipaternalistic foundation is the 
almost reflexive opposition that some courts display toward 
advertisements that promote lawyers by means of dramatization. In 
Farrin v. Thigpen,343 for example, the offending television 
advertisement showed an obviously fictional meeting of insurers who 
immediately choose to settle when they learn the identity of the 
claimant’s attorney.344 Even an impressionable viewer would have 
recognized that this flattering portrayal of the attorney’s reputation 
was a creation of the attorney himself. The commercial included a 
disclaimer: “Dramatization by actors. No specific result implied. 
 
 337. Id. at 242. The number was “1-800-PIT-BULL.” Id. 
 338. See supra note 328 (discussing Pape); Smolla, supra note 328, at 445 (describing 
restrictions on lawyer advertising upheld in Pape as “animated largely by the felt need to 
protect the dignity of the legal profession”). 
 339. Pape, 918 So. 2d at 249. 
 340. Id.  
 341. Id. at 248–49 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 
647 (1985)). 
 342. The referee had found that pit bulls are perceived as “‘loyal, persistent, tenacious, 
and aggressive,’” and that these qualities are “‘objectively relevant to the selection of an 
attorney.’” Id. at 243. By contrast, the Florida Supreme Court ascribed “darker” connotations 
to this image: “malevolence, viciousness, and unpredictability.” Id. at 245. 
 343. 173 F. Supp. 2d 427 (M.D.N.C. 2001). 
 344. Id. at 433–35. 
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Vaughn[, who appeared on camera after the vignette to urge 
accident victims to contact the firm,] is a paid spokesperson for The 
Law Office of James Scott Farrin.”345 Nevertheless, the court found 
the commercial inherently misleading, endorsing a finding of fact 
that it was “likely to create an unjustified expectation about results 
that the lawyer can achieve” and “misrepresent[ed] the importance 
of the myriad of factors that are taken into consideration by an 
insurance company, or its lawyers, when deciding whether and for 
how much a claim should be settled.”346 The court’s determination 
that the advertisement exaggerated the intimidating power of the 
attorney’s reputation and simplified the process by which claims are 
resolved is unexceptionable. The implication that viewers could not 
reach this conclusion on their own, however, assumes a demeaning 
conception of the capacity of viewers to make allowances for 
commercial dramatization in a culture that is saturated with 
advertising of this nature. 
The premise of consumer credulity and irrationality in the face of 
dramatic lawyer advertising on television was laid bare in decisions by 
the highest courts of New Jersey and Iowa. In Petition of Felmeister 
& Isaacs,347 the New Jersey Supreme Court promulgated a rule 
prohibiting the use of “drawings, animations, dramatization, music 
or lyrics” in television attorney advertising.348 Asserting its authority 
as arbiter of what constitutes “the really significant information 
about attorney competence” that should appear in advertisements,349 
the court declared its duty to “prevent attorneys from securing 
clients through nonrational means” and to shield the public from 
portrayals of attorneys as “person[s] having none of the qualities that 
the consumer should consider in selecting a lawyer.”350  
 
 345. Id. at 434. 
 346. Id. at 433. 
 347. 518 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1986). 
 348. Id. at 188–89. 
 349. Id. at 194. 
 350. Id. at 196. In contrast, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized the paternalistic 
basis underlying state attempts to bar lawyer advertising that evokes feelings along with 
communicating information. In State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Schaffer, 648 P.2d 355 (Okla. 
1982), the state bar had sought to suppress an advertisement promoting legal adoption that 
included such language as “to love and cherish as your very own.” Id. at 356. The court 
rejected the argument that the advertisement could be prohibited because it appealed solely to 
the emotions of the reader. This justification, the court found, rested “on the need for 
protecting an unsophisticated lay public from potential harm from lawyer advertising.” Id. at 
358. 
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Similarly, in Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of 
Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Humphrey,351 the Iowa Supreme Court 
sustained a rule prohibiting lawyers’ television advertisements that 
contained background sound; visual displays; more than a single, 
nondramatic voice; or self-laudatory statements.352 Among the 
commercials barred by this rule was one portraying two members of 
a bowling team, shown lamenting the absence of a member of their 
team who was “injured through the negligence of others,” agree that 
the teammate should consult a lawyer, and describe the choice of 
lawyer as important.353 In its original opinion in the case, the court 
found that the techniques employed in such ads “would manipulate 
the viewer’s mind and will.”354 Upon revisiting the issue, the court 
continued to subscribe to the proposition that a vulnerable public 
needs state protection from the overpowering impact of electronic 
media advertising. Viewers of such advertising lack “the opportunity 
accorded to the reader of printed advertisements to pause, to 
restudy, and to thoughtfully consider,”355 and therefore can more 
readily be misled by it.356 
Prohibitions of self-laudatory statements and similar bans on 
claims of quality, then, often embody a belief that consumers cannot 
respond rationally to lawyer advertising that strays from a narrow 
literalism. In a society steeped in boastful claims about myriad goods 
and services, however, it seems doubtful that the public cannot place 
attorneys’ claims of excellence or expertise in proper perspective.357 
 
 351. 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985). 
 352. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Humphrey, 355 
N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1984) (describing the rule adopted by Iowa regarding attorney 
advertisements), vacated, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 571. 
 355. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 646. 
 356. Id. at 570; see also Hirschkop v. Va. State Bar, 604 F.2d 840, 843 (4th Cir. 1979) 
(declining to strike down the state’s ban on self-laudatory statements in wake of Bates because 
such statements “are not so easily verifiable [as ‘the truthful advertising of prices [for] routine 
legal services’], particularly by lay persons” (citations and inner quotations omitted)); Lyon v. 
Ala. State Bar, 451 So. 2d 1367, 1368 (Ala. 1984) (sustaining requirement that lawyer 
advertising include disclaimer that “[n]o representation is made about the quality of legal 
services to be performed or the expertise of the lawyer performing such services”). 
 357. See Andrews, supra note 135, at 1005 (noting, in response to argument that “a 
prohibition against quality claims is necessary to protect the public from ‘puffing,’” that 
consumers may “already [be] so used to discounting the ‘puffing’ in communications about 
products that they will likewise be able to give self-laudatory comments in lawyers’ 
communications their proper weight”); Smolla, supra note 198, at 18 (rejecting “the claim 
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Moreover, this sharply limited notion of the lawyer advertising to 
which consumers can safely be exposed conflicts with 
antipaternalistic principles that transcend commercial speech 
doctrine. Decisions upholding broad bans on subjective claims by 
lawyers necessarily assume that where such claims are not noxious, 
they are at best unhelpful. Yet, the very subjectivity that makes them 
not susceptible to objective verification also renders them not 
demonstrably false. In other contexts, the Court has resisted state 
attempts to decide which communications in the realm of opinion 
are worthy of expression.358 Even if the commercial context warrants 
a heightened wariness of the effect of such communications, 
wholesale condemnation of the entire class seems a disproportionate 
response. The state’s confident assumption that lawyers’ subjective 
representations of their services have no value to potential clients—
that they would not, for example, signal to some a welcome degree 
of confidence—collides with the skeptical view of government’s role 
found in the Court’s broader First Amendment jurisprudence. 
2. The availability of less restrictive alternatives  
If broad prohibitions of lawyers’ self-laudatory statements rest on 
invalid paternalistic premises, their fate under the prevailing Central 
Hudson framework inexorably follows. Under the fourth prong of 
Central Hudson, a wholesale ban on self-laudation—or for that 
matter, related categorical bans on comparisons of service or on 
representations of quality—restricts more speech than is necessary to 
achieve the state’s purpose. That purpose is presumably to prevent 
false, misleading, or deceptive attorney advertising. The less 
restrictive measure is obvious, and already universally in place—viz., 
direct prohibition of all communication that has real potential to 
deceive potential clients, regardless of any other pigeonhole to which 
it might be assigned. Targeting subjective lawyer expression that 
poses the danger at which wider bans are aimed not only conforms 
to the Supreme Court’s aversion to blanket prophylactic restrictions. 
Given the Court’s reluctance to apply the overbreadth doctrine in 
 
that consumers of legal services need special protection against lawyers who make self-
promoting claims about their skills or their tenacity” because “[c]onsumers are simply not that 
gullible”). 
 358. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Greenbelt Coop. 
Publ’g Co. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970). 
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the commercial speech context,359 focusing on whether a particular 
advertisement actually conveys a false impression of the attorney’s 
services is more consistent with the Court’s approach.360 
Even if a general prohibition of misleading and deceptive lawyer 
advertising is too blunt an instrument to curb the confusion that 
might result from subjective claims, completely forbidding certain 
kinds of advertising would still clash with the Court’s imperative that 
categorical bans are a last resort. If stark self-laudation, comparisons, 
or other claims of quality sometimes carry real potential to induce 
consumers to make ill-considered decisions about the selection of 
lawyers, the cure is presumably more information, not censorship. In 
today’s electronic era, a massive amount of data can be made 
available online. Thus, directing consumers to a website with 
information that the state reasonably deems pertinent is more 
compatible with Central Hudson’s tailoring requirement than a 
blanket prohibition of subjective representations. In addition, as with 
products and services generally, limited disclaimers might be 
required when they do not impose an undue burden on attorneys’ 
communications.361 
Similarly, a campaign of education by the organized bar to 
promote its views of thoughtful ways to select a lawyer is more 
consistent with First Amendment principles than dictating the 
content of advertisements. As far back as Bates, the Court observed 
that “[i]f the naivete of the public will cause advertising by attorneys 
to be misleading, then it is the bar’s role to assure that the populace 
is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place advertising in its 
 
 359. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1970) (“[T]he justification for 
the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial 
context.”). 
 360. See Ewald, supra note 301, at 481 (asserting that states may regulate self-laudatory 
claims that are misleading, but that “they should do so because of a constitutionally 
permissible reason rather than because they are self-laudatory”); see also Schwartz v. Welch, 
890 F. Supp. 565, 573 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (describing the testimony of a scholar in the field of 
professional responsibility who stated that most states “simply prohibit false, deceptive and 
misleading advertising,” “question[ed] the prohibition against ‘self-laudatory’ advertisements,” 
and “not[ed] that advertising is self-laudatory by its very nature, emphasizing as it does the 
qualities of the goods or services advertised”). 
 361. See Mason v. Fla. Bar, 208 F.3d 952, 958 (11th Cir. 2000) (invalidating the 
requirement that an attorney place a disclaimer on his advertisement, which accurately stated 
that he received the highest rating from Martindale-Hubbell National Law Directory, because 
such a requirement failed the third prong of the Central Hudson test). 
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proper perspective.”362 Indeed, what may create the greatest 
incentive for blanket bans on self-laudation and other subjective 
claims to the bar and state agencies is their work-saving potential, 
sparing these bodies the trouble of educating the public and 
identifying deceptive advertisements individually. As the Court ruled 
in Shapero, however, “the First Amendment does not permit a ban 
on certain speech merely because it is more efficient.”363 
3. Attempting to circumvent the state’s burden 
Of course, a restriction on lawyer advertising is not subject to the 
rigorous scrutiny of Central Hudson’s fourth prong if the 
advertisement fails to survive the first part of that test because it is 
misleading.364 The state, however, does not meet its burden of 
demonstrating the misleading nature of an advertisement or category 
of advertising merely by incanting the dangers of misleading speech. 
Rather, it must present persuasive evidence that the advertising that 
it seeks to suppress has genuine potential to sow misunderstanding 
among the public. Reviewing the Bates Court’s analysis of lawyer 
advertising, the Wisconsin Supreme Court inferred that “sufficient 
evidence must be introduced to support a finding that the 
advertisement is improper” to warrant discipline.365 Even more to the 
point, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Mason v. Florida 
Bar366 recognized that “[a] state cannot satisfy its burden to 
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restrictions 
will alleviate the identified harm by rote invocation of the words 
“‘potentially misleading.’”367 
The context in which the Mason court issued its pronouncement 
aptly illustrates the intolerance for unsupported assumptions that 
proper application of commercial speech doctrine entails. The 
Florida Bar found that Mason’s advertisement, stating that he was 
“‘AV’ Rated, the Highest Rating Martindale-Hubbell National Law 
 
 362. Bates, 433 U.S. at 375. 
 363. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 473 (1988). 
 364. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
 365. In re Marcus, 320 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Wis. 1982) (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 382). 
 366. 208 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 367. Id. at 956. 
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Directory,” violated its proscription of self-laudatory statements.368 
For Mason to convey this admittedly accurate information, the Bar 
ruled that his advertisement must include an elaborate explanation of 
the rating’s meaning and the process by which it was attained.369 The 
Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected the Bar’s unsubstantiated 
contention that the lay person’s unfamiliarity with Martindale-
Hubbell’s system would induce the public to exaggerate the 
significance of Mason’s rating. The court was especially unimpressed 
that the Bar had “presented no studies, nor empirical evidence of any 
sort to suggest that Mason’s statement would mislead the 
unsophisticated public.”370 This deficiency was not mitigated by the 
Bar’s requirement of a disclaimer rather than a total prohibition, for 
“[e]ven partial restrictions on commercial speech must be supported 
by a showing of some identifiable harm.”371 Having failed to meet its 
burden of “producing concrete evidence” that Mason’s 
advertisement threatened to mislead the public, the Bar could not 
justify imposing an “unduly burdensome disclosure requirement[] 
[that] offend[s] the First Amendment.”372 
The Mason court did not call into question the facial validity of 
the Florida Bar’s rule or of prohibitions on describing the quality of 
legal services.373 Nevertheless, its logic concerning the burden of 
showing harm from advertising that the state seeks to suppress raises 
doubts about broad bans on lawyers’ subjective claims about their 
services. The court itself acknowledged that a bright line between 
objective and subjective statements cannot serve as a categorical 
touchstone for the protection of lawyer advertising. Apparently 
alluding to Martindale-Hubbell’s reliance on opinions expressed by 
confidential sources,374 the court addressed the Bar’s contention that 
its required disclaimer advanced an interest in encouraging attorney 
rating services to use objective criteria.375 Absent explanation or 
 
 368. Id. at 954 (stating that the rule forbade lawyers to make “statements that [were] 
merely self-laudatory or statements describing or characterizing the quality of the lawyer’s 
services in advertisements and written communication”). 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. at 957. 
 371. Id. at 958. 
 372. Id. (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 
512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 373. See id. at 959. 
 374. See id. at 954. 
 375. Id. at 956. 
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evidence from the Bar, the court found this interest insubstantial 
because it “fail[ed] to see the value in the distinction between 
objective and subjective criteria” in rating services.376 Though 
confined to this context, the court’s skepticism toward that 
distinction can be extended to the larger resistance to lawyers’ 
subjective characterizations of their service. The thrust of commercial 
speech doctrine suggests that it no longer suffices to base the 
position that such claims are inherently misleading on intuition and 
common sense. The state must prove it. 
4. Persistent belief in the singularity of lawyers 
Ultimately, of course, the entire edifice of special restrictions on 
lawyer advertising rests on the premise that offers of legal services 
pose special hazards to an unwary public. The Bates Court’s dicta on 
the potentially misleading nature of claims as to the quality of 
services377 was rooted in the premise that “the public lacks 
sophistication concerning legal services.”378 Whatever the force of 
that tentative logic as an original matter, it has been eroded by the 
Court’s own repeated rejection of official efforts to suspend the 
principles governing commercial speech in the realm of attorney 
advertising.379 
At some point, the Court may confront the tension between the 
idea that First Amendment protection is confined to lawyers’ 
verifiable claims and the aggregate effect of Court refusals to treat 
lawyer advertising as a disfavored subclass of commercial speech. 
That confrontation could well come in the context of a challenge to 
the proscription of attorneys’ self-laudation or of subjective 
comparisons to other attorneys. Protecting such advertising when 
the state has not shown it to be misleading would align the Court’s 
doctrine with the trend of its holdings in this area and with its larger 
commercial speech jurisprudence. Conversely, treating lawyer 
advertising as a zone of stunted constitutional protection could 
prove an unsustainable enterprise. The practice of law is obviously a 
distinctive and honorable profession. Assigning the speech of its 
 
 376. Id. 
 377. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 366 (1970); see also discussion supra Part 
IV.B. 
 378. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383. 
 379. See supra Part III.B. 
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practitioners to the same constitutional regime that governs the 
expression of others advances, rather than undermines, the 
profession’s eminent status.380 
V. CONCLUSION 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has struck down 
numerous restrictions on commercial speech that were not justified 
as needed responses to demonstrable harms. Attempts by the 
organized bar and its state allies to restrain lawyer advertising have 
not been exempt from the potent scrutiny of modern commercial 
speech doctrine. As a result, the Court has repeatedly struck down 
restraints on lawyers’ expression grounded in unsupported 
assumptions about the ignorance or irrationality of the public. In the 
wake of these decisions, rules against subjective claims remain one of 
the last bastions of restrictions on attorneys’ advertising. Categorical 
bans on self-laudation, comparisons with other lawyers, and other 
subjective claims, however, are increasingly hard to square with the 
Court’s broader approach to commercial speech. Given the Court’s 
reluctance to apply the overbreadth doctrine in this area, such 
prohibitions may be whittled away piecemeal rather than facially 
invalidated. Still, even this more limited development would advance 
the salutary notion that the profession charged with defending First 




 380. A template for this approach may be found in the Court’s holding in Republican 
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). There, the Court struck down on First 
Amendment grounds a Minnesota law prohibiting a candidate for judicial office from 
“announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.” Id. at 770–74. The Court 
pointedly rejected the argument that “[j]udges are not politicians, and the First Amendment 
does not require that they be treated as politicians simply because they are chosen by popular 
vote.” Id. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Rather, writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
declared: “If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic 
process, it must accord the participants in that process . . . the First Amendment rights that 
attach to their roles.” Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, the 
Court may conclude that a legal profession, operating in a manner like that of other 
commercial enterprises in a market economy, is governed by widely applicable First 
Amendment standards. 
